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Abstract
SILVIYA NIKOLOVA: Health Insurance Transitions of SCHIP-Eligible
Children in Response to Higher Public Premiums.
(Under the direction of Thomas Mroz.)
This is the first study to explore the impact of premium variation across individ-
uals, states, and time on enrollment in the State Children’s Health Insurance Pro-
gram and their transitions to private insurance or uninsurance in response to higher
premiums. With a sample of income-eligible children from the Medical Expendi-
ture Panel Survey, I evaluate the effect of premium changes on public and private
insurance enrollment and uninsurance using a wide array of methods: Regression-
Discontinuity Design for the study of the within-state variations in premiums, cross-
sectional analysis for evaluating the response using across-state variation in premiums,
and difference-in-differences strategies that exploit temporal variations in premiums.
The main regression-discontinuity estimates point to significant declines in public en-
rollment along with significant increases in private take-up and no change in the rate
of uninsurance. The cross-sectional results support the finding that higher premiums
are associated with statistically important decrease in public enrollment and increase
in private. I find no evidence of increases in the rate of uninsurance as a result of public
premium increases. These results are reinforced by the longitudinal findings. They indi-
cate a statistically significant decline in public enrollment, significant increase in private
and no change in uninsurance for children in the higher-income group in response to a
per dollar increase in premium over the course of 2003 year.
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Chapter 1
Premium Increases and
Disenrollment from SCHIP
1.1 The Problem
Concerns about the adequacy of health insurance coverage for children have expanded
Medicaid from a program only for low-income families to a broader program for families
who earn too much money to qualify for Medicaid, yet not enough to afford private
insurance. The highly successful State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)
was created by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 which appropriated $24 billion over
five years and $40 billion over ten years to help states expand health insurance coverage.
Like Medicaid, SCHIP is a partnership between federal and state governments. The
programs are run by the individual states according to requirements set by the federal
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The SCHIP law offers states three op-
tions for covering uninsured children. States can use SCHIP funds to cover children
through Medicaid-independent children’s health insurance programs (separate child
health programs), expand coverage available under Medicaid (SCHIP Medicaid ex-
pansion programs), or combine both strategies (SCHIP combination programs). States
with separate child health programs have more latitude than Medicaid programs. They
have a great deal of flexibility in their cost-sharing and plan benefits structure, as well
as in eligibility and enrollment matters. Flexibility is regulated at the federal level and
state plans must receive approval prior to implementation.
Most SCHIP programs require enrollees to share in the cost of coverage or services.
Oftentimes, a monthly premium is charged with co-payments (e.g., a beneficiary would
pay a monthly charge regardless of utilization and a co-payment when a service is uti-
lized). While the majority of separate programs require participants to pay a monthly
premium, others allow participants to pay on a quarterly or annual basis. As of Decem-
ber 2003, twenty-six separate programs and nine Medicaid expansion programs charged
premiums with those charging a premium having obtained special waivers to do so. As
SCHIP programs are subject to the same financial pressures as private health insurance,
eleven states increased premiums in 2003.
In this paper, I investigate the impact of premium increases on disenrollment from
SCHIP. The analysis is based on a unique data set that combines 12 months of en-
rollment data from the nationally representative Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS) with information on eligibility rules and premium levels for all states and the
District of Columbia (D.C.). The study employs a wide array of methods: Regression-
Discontinuity Design for the study of the within-state variations in premiums, cross-
sectional analysis for evaluating the response using across-state variation in premiums,
and a difference-in-differences strategy that exploits temporal variations in premiums.
The main regression-discontinuity estimates point to significant declines in enrollment
in response to higher premiums. The cross-sectional results based on the two most
homogeneous samples support the finding that higher premiums are associated with
decrease in enrollment. These results are reinforced by the difference-in-differences
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findings. They indicate a statistically significant decline in public enrollment for chil-
dren in the higher income group in response to a per dollar increase in premium over
the course of one year.
The paper is structured in the following way. I start out with a brief introduction
to the SCHIP program and a discussion of some earlier studies that spell out the
importance of premium increases on disenrollment from SCHIP. Section 1.3 presents
the economic model. Section 1.4 details the methodology. Section 2.5 describes the
data and health insurance eligibility assignment procedure. Section 2.6 discusses the
estimation results. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
The purpose of this section is twofold; namely the comparison of the different methods
used in premium policy analysis and review of the results in previous literature. The
section compares different methods that have been applied to the analysis of premium
impacts and contrasts the ability of these methods to deal adequately with the con-
sequences of endogeneity. The section also reviews earlier works that document the
extent to which premium increases affect disenrollment from the SCHIP program.
The evaluation of the impact of premium increases on disenrollment needs to deal
with “enrollment” endogeneity. Children who remain covered and those who do not
may be very different with respect to their health, family resources, and preferences.
Shenkman, for example, finds that following a premium change, the short-term enroll-
ment duration for children with moderate to major chronic conditions is not affected,
while for healthy children, it decreases. Studies that imperfectly control for factors
that have the potential to impact the enrollment outcome, such as the health of the
child as in Shenkman’s research, may incorrectly estimate the effect of premium on
coverage. Omitting a significant regressor from the regression equation may lead to
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biased estimates for the coefficients on the included variables.
Differences in coverage may also result from the fact that differences in the levels
of and jumps in premiums across states are more likely the result of purposeful policy
making than of a natural experiment, and thus adequate controls for the forces behind
these levels and changes are needed. The New Hampshire SCHIP experience proves
that, through careful design of the premium policy, it is possible to reach a high rate
of health insurance coverage for children and, at the same time, to charge some of the
highest premiums in the country. Another problem in SCHIP evaluation arises because
true insurance status is not observed and must be assigned. Assignment error can
result either because the assignment process fails to completely replicate the insurance
assignment process or simply because the information on income has been misreported.
Several studies (Kappel, 2004; Mann and Artiga, 2004) examine month-to-month
changes in SCHIP enrollment in states that increase their premiums and find a decrease
in enrollment following the premium hike. Although these studies do not control for
other factors that might impact on enrollment and they record trends that are strictly
state-specific, these papers establish a relationship and provide an insight about possible
dependence of the premium effect on income, child age, and timing.
There are also state-specific studies that explore the impact of premium increases
in a regression setting using data from Florida (Shenkman et al., 2002; Shenkman,
Herndon and Vogel, 2006); New Hampshire, Kansas, and Kentucky (Kenney, Alli-
son, Costich, Marton and McFeeters, 2006); Arizona and Kentucky (Kenney, Costich,
Marton and McFeeters, 2006), and Kentucky(Marton, 2006). All studies find that dis-
enrollment increases following the premium hikes. The common approach to modeling
the probability of enrollment is to use a Cox proportional hazard model with premium
policy change as a time-varying covariate (i.e., the premium variable is a time-varying
variable that takes the value zero before the premium increase and the value one after
4
the premium increase). This model is designed for individual-state analysis, but can
be easily modified to apply to the analysis of national data, for example, by includ-
ing a variable for the premium level instead of a dummy into the regression equation.
Comparing the same subjects’ response before and after a policy intervention requires
that the effect is registered quickly, before other factors vary. Otherwise, a control
group is needed to absorb the “time effects”. In the literature to date, only Marton
(2006) has taken advantage of the treatment versus control relationship between two in-
come categories in SCHIP. He compares the disenrollment probabilities obtained by the
same model but applied to two different income groups. The author draws conclusions
about the impact of premium increases on the duration of enrollment by comparing
exit probabilities after the premium hike to the baseline probability for the group.
Only three studies, to the best of my knowledge, combine data on multiple states in
examining the impact of the SCHIP premium on enrollment. The estimates based on
national data affirm the single-state findings that higher premiums reduce enrollment.
Kronebusch and Elbel (2004) simultaneously analyze the impact of various SCHIP
policies that may influence enrollment. Hadley, Reschovsky, Cunningham, Dubay and
Kenney (2006) and Kenney, Hadley and Blavin (2006) provide independent estimates
of the effect of public insurance premium on SCHIP enrollment using a multinomial
logit regression. This econometric approach controls for the costs of private insurance
and the transitions between public and private insurance and “no insurance” following
public premium increases. In addition, Hadley et al. (2006) introduce controls for the
effect of two other policy variables: SCHIP waiting period and enrollment cap. The
repeated-cross-sections nature of the data in these studies allows the use of controls for
year effects and/or state-fixed effects. Although such models constitute an advance over
those that look at premium impacts in a cross-section framework, they are sensitive
to the inclusion of state-level variables, for example the rate of unemployment, that
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directly influence premium policy and enrollment.
In this paper I re-examine the effects of premium increases on disenrollment from
SCHIP using several approaches. I use a simple Regression-Discontinuity (RD) model
to examine enrollment decisions in the largest state in my data set making use of
the specific features of the state’s SCHIP program 1. I also study the impact of the
SCHIP premium on enrollment combining cross-sectional data on all states to estimate
the average impact of premium increase on enrollment of children in the high-income
SCHIP group. I employ a Difference-in-Differences specification to examine the impact
of the temporal variation in premium.
1.3 SCHIP Enrollment Decision. Economic Model
In this section I present a one-period model of the SCHIP enrollment decision. The
probability that a child becomes sick depends on the health stock at the beginning
of the period. The family’s decision problem can be described as having to make an
optimal choice over a discrete set of insurance and non-insurance related characteristics.
The decision to provide a SCHIP eligible child with health insurance is defined as a
choice over the following set of coverage options: (j = 1) enroll in SCHIP, (j = 2)
enroll in private health insurance, and (j = 3) be uninsured. The enrollment decision
can be thought of as choosing the maximum over the value functions associated with
each health insurance alternative. Given health insurance status, parents decide on the
number of medical visits M , and on the amount of other health-related goods G.
The parents’ utility depends upon their consumption of non-health related goods (Z)
1For convenience I will henceforth use the term ”income group” when discussing a group of SCHIP
children who belong to a state-specific income bracket.
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and on the health stock of the child at the end of the period (H). If the child becomes
sick during the period, the parents, conditional on insurance choice j, make optimizing
decisions about medical care and other health-related goods. Medical treatment M
and other child health-related goods G improve the health of the child. The level of the
health stock decreases if more medical treatment is needed at the end of the period.
The parents will choose some non-negative amount of other health goods regardless
of whether the child is sick or well as the marginal utility with respect to Z increases
steeply for low values of Z. Thus the end-of-period health stock could be smaller, larger,
or the same as the initial health stock.
A health production process generates the end-of-period health stock of the child
which is dependent upon medical services received M , other child health-related goods
G, initial health stock H , and health shock µ. Formally, the health of a child is
Hµ(M,G,H). For expositional convenience µ is assumed to take on only two values
referred to as sick or well. The marginal product of health inputs differs for sick and well
children. It is straightforward to extend the model to different types of illness with the
marginal productivity of the inputs depending on the health shock realization. Figure
1.1 shows a plausible relation between the stock of health and medical treatment. The
slope of the curve in the figure at any point gives the marginal product of medical
visits. Health stock increases at a decreasing rate and reaches its upper limit as the
number of medical visits becomes equal to or larger than Mmax. Other health goods
improve child’s health and an increase in G leads to an increase in the health stock for
any level of necessary medical treatment needed for a sick child to recover.
lim
G→0
dH
dG
→∞ (1.1)
The probability of sickness pis depends on the health stock at the beginning of the
period H . Note that the probability of being sick does not depend on the current choice
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of inputs M and G.
pis(H) = 1− piw(H) (1.2)
where piw is the probability of being well.
Given health insurance coverage j and health shock µ of the child, sick or healthy,
the parents choose how many medical visits to make and how much of other child-
health related goods to buy. It is assumed that Mmax = 0 for healthy children. Let
the variable α reflect the exogenous proportion of the total value of medical care for
which an insured individual is responsible, α ∈ [0, 1]. The product αC denotes the
out-of-pocket expenditures of a medical visit, which reflects the total price C of a visit.
Thus, α = 0 implies no out-of-pocket payment by the consumer and α = 1 implies
full out-of-pocket expenditures by the consumer. If an individual is uninsured, then he
always faces the full price of medical treatment. Premium P depends on the insurance
coverage type as well with P 3 = 0 if the parents opt to have the child uninsured. To
the extent that copayments and premiums vary with j, the utility maximizing amounts
of M , G, and Z under each health state will depend on the insurance choice.
Depending on the health state, the parents face two different budget constraints:
Zj =


Y − P j − pgG
j
w if the child is well
Y − P j −M jαjC − pgG
j if the child is sick
(1.3)
where Z is consumption of non-health related goods, the variable Y denotes family
income. The model assumes that the price of other health goods pg and the price of
the non-health related goods pz are exogenous. Further, pz is normalized to $1.
The parents solve two optimization problems for each insurance coverage. When
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the child is sick:
max
Z
j
s ,M
j
s ,G
j
s
U(Zjs , H
s(M js , G
j
s, H))
s.t. Zj = Y − P j −M jαjC − pgG
j
Let (Zj
∗
s ,M
j∗
s , G
j∗
s ) denote the optimal choice of non-health related goods, medical
services, and other child health-related goods for insurance j when the child is sick.
The value function for insurance j with a sick child is
V j,s(Y, pz, pg, α
j, C, P j) ≡ U(Zj
∗
s , H
s(M j
∗
s , G
j∗
s , H))
When the child is well the family’s optimization problem for insurance j is
max
Z
j
w,G
j
w
U(Zjw, H
w(Gjw, H))
s.t. Zj = Y − P j − pgG
j
w
Analogously, (Zj
∗
w ,M
j∗
w , G
j∗
w ) are the optimal consumption choice of non-health related
goods, medical services and other child health-related goods for insurance j when the
child is well. The value function for insurance j when the child is well is:
V j,w(Y, pz, pg, P
j) ≡ U(Zj
∗
w , Hw(G
j∗
w , H))
Thus, for each insurance choice, prior to knowing whether their child is sick or not, the
parents have the following expected value function:
EV j = (1− piw)V
j,s(Y, pz, pg, α
j, C, P j) + piwV
j,w(Y, pz, pg, P
j)
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The parents choose the insurance alternative j associated with the maximum expected
value function.
Insurance policies are assumed to differ only in their premium and copayment struc-
ture.Further, in the case of SCHIP and private insurance coverage, it is assumed that
there are no copayments. Thus, a higher expected value is associated with a lower-
premium insurance. The choice between being insured or uninsured depends on the
difference between expected value functions associated with these two choices.
An extensive body of literature (see Shenkman, Herndon and Vogel, 2006; Marton,
2006) has established the importance of the SCHIP premium on the decision to enroll in
the program. A usual problem that arises in the evaluation of the premium effect is the
lack of information on all factors that influence the enrollment decision, many of which
are unobserved by the researcher. The most important information that is typically
missing is the cost of the coverage options that a family has. The missing data include
the out-of-pocket expenditures for treatment if the child is uninsured and premiums
for the health plans that are available to and chosen by the family. I define gain as the
difference between the expected value function associated with the SCHIP plan and
the value function associated with the most preferred option other than SCHIP. Thus,
for child i the decision to enroll in public coverage is determined by the positive gain
from choosing SCHIP coverage over the next best alternative insurance option.
EN∗i = EV
1
i −max(EV
2
i , EV
3
i ) (1.4)
Following Van der Klaauw (2002), who models the choice to enroll in college as a
function of discretionary aid offered, I specify the utility associated with SCHIP choice
as a linear function of the premium and an unobserved component capturing all other
factors. Let P denote the SCHIP premium and PA denote the premium fee associated
with the “most preferred” alternative. Then, for a child i the enrollment decision can
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be defined as
EN∗i = τi + δ(Pi − P
A
i ) + vi (1.5)
where the unobserved random component vi measures all other individual differences
in expected utility associated with alternative choice options and τi is a person-specific
intercept. The larger the value of EN∗, the larger the probability that a child will
enroll in the SCHIP program.
Thus, the SCHIP enrollment decision depends on the SCHIP premium amount as
well as on the premium payment requested for participation in the “most preferred”
option. As mentioned above, information on private premiums are not available to the
researcher. With PAi unobserved, the utility difference can be written as
EN∗i = τi + δPi + εi (1.6)
where εi = δP
A
i +vi. Generally, one would expect premium payments for other coverage
options and the payment for SCHIP to be correlated since they all depend on the same
set of family and child characteristics, for example family income. Therefore, Pi and εi
are likely to be correlated.
With ENi = 1 if EN
∗
i > 0 and ENi = 0 otherwise, the probability that the child
will be enrolled in SCHIP is given by:
Pr(EN∗i = 1) = Pr(δPi + εi > 0)
Pr(EN∗i = 0) = 1− Pr(EN
∗
i = 1)
(1.7)
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The enrollment decision could be described by a linear probability model specifica-
tion for Eqn. 1.7:
ENi = β + αPi + ui (1.8)
where ui like εi is expected to be correlated with Pi because of omitted variables.
Because of omitted variables problems, when evaluating the effect of premium on en-
rollment the former cannot be considered exogenous with respect to the enrollment
decision. Section 1.4 addresses the different approaches of dealing with the endogene-
ity issue.
1.4 Methodology
The goal of an evaluation is to measure the effect of a variation in premium across
families, states, and over time on SCHIP insurance coverage. The purpose of this
section is to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the evaluation analysis later in the
paper. The estimation problem, irrespective of the dimensionality of the change, arises
because SCHIP-eligible children, depending on their family income, can be assigned
only to one income group with a fixed premium. No family is observed paying both
low and high premiums at the same time. Thus we do not know what would have
been the coverage status of the child had the child not been placed, for example, in the
“treatment” group that requires a high premium.
To identify and estimate the treatment effect of interest, one must, instead, rely on
comparison between the outcomes of two groups, a treatment (d = 1) and a control
(d = 0), which are as similar as possible in characteristics other than the treatment itself
(Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw, 2001). Estimating the effect of premium on SCHIP
enrollment utilizes knowledge of discontinuities in the income group assignment rule and
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of changes in premium levels over time. SCHIP eligible children can be divided into
two groups on the basis of the interval a calculated family income index fell into. These
intervals are determined by a state-specific income score I2. Children with household
income I at or above I are referred to as being in the treatment group and children
with income I below I are referred to as being in the control group.
The actual decision rule for assigning SCHIP eligible children to income groups
varies across states and therefore is difficult to characterize by a simple formula. How-
ever, within each state, the assignment rule is fairly simple and easy to implement.
One such rule, adopted by the largest state in my data set referred to as state X , says
that children based on their family income are assigned to the following two groups:
children with family income below 150 percent of the federal poverty line fall into the
low income group while children with income at or above 150 of the federal poverty
line and below 250 are assigned to the high income group.
The premiums differ by income group with higher premiums for higher-income fam-
ilies. However, within an income group, the premium payment is fixed. In the case of
state X , parents pay a premium of $7 per month for the SCHIP insurance coverage of
a child assigned to the low income group and $9 for a child when in the high income
group. Thus, the premium payment as a function of I will contain jump at the cutoff
between the first and second income intervals.
Because of the discontinuity in the amount of premium charged as a function of
family income measure, the assignment mechanism conforms to that of the Regression-
Discontinuity Design. If everyone just above the income cutoff was assigned to the
treatment group, the RD design is referred to as sharp. If there are other factors that
place into the control group children who, on the basis of their family income, are to
2Although there can be up to three income cutoffs in a certain state, because of sample size
restrictions, I estimate the premium effect focusing on the intervals below and above the first income
cutoff.
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be assigned to the treatment, the RD setup is fuzzy.
I focus on the theoretic and econometric considerations under the sharp design, as
there are no data on the decision to enroll in SCHIP. All children with I ≥ I are as-
signed to the treatment group if they are observed to be covered by public insurance.
Respectively, children with I < I are assigned to the control. Thus, as incomes crosses
the eligibility threshold I, the treatment status steps from 0 to 1. That is, the “re-
constructed” treatment status depends deterministically on whether family income I
is above the cutoff value I.
1.4.1 Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design
In the SCHIP program children are assigned to treatment and control groups solely on
the basis of an observed continuous income variable I. Thus, the assignment makes the
two income groups very different at least in terms of their average income values. This
is in sharp contrast with pure randomization
Despite no randomization taking place, the premium effect on enrollment y can
be identified and estimated within the framework of a RD design using a sample of
individuals within a very small interval around the income cutoff where the I value is
practically the same. The essential nonparametric identification requirement in RD is
for borderline (or threshold) randomization: those subjects near the income threshold
are likely to be similar in all observable and unobservable aspects except the premium
level. A standard regression model representation of the evaluation problem with the
sharp regression-discontinuity design is
ydi = αi + βddi + udi (1.9)
where d = 1 if the child is assigned to the treatment group. Oftentimes the modest
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number of data points just below and just above the cutoff motivates the exploration for
premium effects on enrollment by looking at wider intervals around the income cutoff
point. Considering a narrow interval around the threshold is likely to produce a bias
in the effect estimate as the observations entering the estimation are heterogeneous in
income. The inclusion of a smooth function g(I) which is continuous at the income
cutoff addresses this income dependence issue. In the case of the RD design it is often
assumed that the “true” functional form of I can be approximated by some known
polynomial. The model for the observed SCHIP enrollment is specified
ydi = αi + βddi + g(Ii) + udi (1.10)
where u0 is the unobserved error term for those below the cutoff and u1 for those above.
Note that Eqn. 1.10 can be rewritten
yi = αi + βddi + g(Ii) + ui (1.11)
where ui ≡ (1− di)u0i + diu1i is a composite error term.
Under the above assumption that individuals near the income cutoff share the same
observable and unobservable characteristics except the treatment, we can claim that
the limiting conditional expectation of the error term given income from above and
from below the threshold is the same or that
lim
I↓I
E(u|I) = lim
I↑I
E(u|I) (1.12)
By definition of u0 and u1, the term on the left is lim
I↓I
E(u1|I) and the term on the right
is lim
I↑I
E(u0|I).
By definition of y0i and y1i the difference in outcomes for the two treatment groups
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is
y1i − y0i = βd + u1i − u0i (1.13)
Asymptotically, the difference between the mean enrollment outcomes for children on
each side of the cutoff is
βd + lim
I→I
E(u1 − u0|I) (1.14)
As explained above the limiting conditional expectations of the error terms on either
side of the cutoff are the same. Thus βd is the treatment effect. As illustrated in Figure
1.2, βd can be estimated as the difference between two linear, regression lines at the
cutoff point, which in this case equals the difference in the intercepts of the regression
lines.
McCrary and Royer (2006) present a succinct comparison of the two procedures for
estimating treatment effects using the RD approach. One procedure uses global poly-
nomial estimators (see, for example, the references in Card and Lee (2006)). However,
Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw (2001) support estimation with local linear regression,
a nonparametric smoother studied in detail in the statistics literature and known to
exhibit good boundary properties.
Using the local Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach of Hahn, Todd and Van der
Klaauw (2001) I minimize
∑
i∈J
(yi − αi − βddi − g(Ii))
2
(1.15)
where J denotes the subsample such that I−h < Ii < I+h and h is the bandwidth. In
this notation, the parameter βd measures the discontinuity in the expected enrollment
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for individuals on both sides of the income cutoff between two income groups, or the
vertical distance at Ii = I. The bandwidth around the cutoff determines the share
of the sample included in the analysis, with smaller bandwidths producing less biased
estimates with higher standard errors.
1.4.2 Cross-Sectional Model
To see how the premium effect can be identified and estimated when data on multiple
states are combined, notice that the premium levels for the low-income and high-income
groups, in general, differ not only within the state, a feature explored so far in the
study, but also across states. Since state X is relatively larger in size compared to
the entire sample, I do the following: first, I combine data on states with two income
groups excluding state X. Defining the sample in this way is equivalent to splitting
all available data into two distinct groups and running separate regressions for each of
them. Second, I check the robustness of results by combining state X and all other
states in one sample.
In the multiple state specification I assume that people around the state-specific
cutoffs should be the same in their observable (income) and unobservable characteris-
tics. As a first step to specifying a multiple-state regression equation for the impact
of premium, I define a regression equation for state 1 which is one of the states with
two SCHIP income groups. In the individual-state regression specification variable
J1 is a dummy that controls for the impact of the higher-income group premium on
public insurance enrollment. The estimate of the constant θ1 captures the impact of
state-specific factors affecting the enrollment of the lower income group one of which
is premium. The state 1 regression equation is specified as
yi1 = θ1 + β1J1 + g(Ii1) + ui1 (1.16)
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Analogously, the regression equation for state 2 is
yi2 = θ2 + β2J2 + g(Ii2) + ui2 (1.17)
Combining across-state data by imposing linear and constant premium effects as well
as constant income effects across states, the two-state regression model representation
is
yis
i∈J1
⋃
J2
= θ1 ∗ 1(i ∈ 1) + θ2 ∗ 1(i ∈ 2) + β
2∑
s=1
Js + g(Ii) + uis (1.18)
where Js is the magnitude of the premium jump above the point of discontinuity for
state s. The estimate of β captures the impact of a $1 variation in the premium increase
on enrollment of children whose family income is at or above the state income cutoff.
Because we assume constant premium effects across states, the effect estimate β is the
same for state 1 and state 2. θ1 and θ2 are state dummies controlling respectively
for the impact of state 1 and state 2 specific factors. These are factors that impact
the low-income group probability of enrollment with the low premium fee being one
of them. J1
⋃
J2 denotes the subsamples from both states used in the analysis such
that, for state 1, I1 − h < Ii1 < I1 + h, I1 is state 1 specific income cutoff; for state 2,
I2 − h < Ii2 < I2 + h with I2 the income cutoff. h is the bandwidth around cutoff.
Including multiple states in the evaluation of across-state premium variation modi-
fies the two-state regression specification as follows:
yis
i∈
⋃
Js
=
S∑
s=1
θs ∗ 1(i ∈ s) + β
S∑
s=1
Js + g(Iis) + uis (1.19)
Recall that the underlying assumption for the cross-sectional regression specification is
that the premium increase effect is linear and proportional for all states. The β estimate
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is interpreted as the effect of a $1 variation in the jump in premium on enrollment of
children whose family income places them just above the cutoff. While the high-income
groups are constrained to differ only in their premiums, the inclusion of state specific
dummies allows the control groups to differ across states regardless of the income cutoff
value for the jump in the premium.
1.4.3 Difference-in-Differences Design
Related to RD is “before-after” (BA) design, where the discontinuity takes place in
the time dimension. Here, the control response comes from the period before the
treatment, whereas the treatment response comes from the period after the treatment.
To identify the impact of premium on enrollment, I can compare child participation
in the SCHIP before and after the month of the premium change (t), with t denoting
months, dt = 1[t ≥ t]. For BA design to be effective the break should be defined
clearly and the effect should be measured soon after the premium change before other
covariates change. This is analogous to the borderline randomization of RD, where in a
small temporal neighborhood, the period just before the treatment should be compared
to the period just after the treatment, because other changes are unlikely to take place
over the short term.
SCHIP families that fail to pay their premiums will lose insurance coverage. Fre-
quently, however, families that renege on their current payments are provided with a
grace period3 before their children become disenrolled, and the length varies by state.
This implies that the outcome of interest may take place gradually over time which
makes it difficult to separate the treatment effect from the “time effect” due to other
factors that vary over the same period.
3A grace period is a specified period of time during which children can continue to access services
after the payment due date. This allows families who fall behind in paying their premiums time to
catch up on past payments before their children lose coverage.
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The existence of grace periods with varying length in the SCHIP program motivates
the use of “Difference-in-Differences” (DD) method. The advantage of DD over the BA
approach is that there is a control group which incurs the time effect but not the
treatment effect. Using the control group, the treatment can be identified even if the
treatment takes place gradually. In a DD, the treatment is given only to a certain group
of individuals, and those left out constitute the control group. In contrast, in BA (and
RD), everybody gets the treatment without exception. Hence, there is no contemporary
control group in BA. Only the treatment group’s past before the treatment is available
as a control group. In addtion, the DD parameter estimates will vary depending on the
length of the time period considered.
To explore the temporal variation created by premium changes over time, I com-
pare the SCHIP programme enrollment of children for states with two income groups4.
Widening the window around the time cutoff shifts the identification from a local
regression-discontinuity to a global difference-in-differences one, including only obser-
vations that are close to the state income cutoff. Let yit be a (0,1) insurance outcome
for the SCHIP coverage. As in RD evaluation, in each state the high-income group is
selected as the“treatment” (d = 1) and the high- and low-income group are assumed
to differ only in their premium fees. Thus, presuming the high and low income groups
are similar in some state-specific unobserved aspects, then by choosing the low-income
group as the control in each state these unobserved aspects are controlled for. I also
define a binary time variable t that takes a value of either 0 or 1 depending on whether
the child is observed before or after the premium change. The variable V is just the
premium level which varies over time and by income group. This leads to:
yit = α + βd+ γt+ δVit + β
′
zzit + εit (1.20)
4As explained earlier, the multiple-state sample does not include state X.
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The DD regression specification implies that for the average child the lower income
group enrollment in SCHIP in the period before the premium change t = 0 is:
y00 = α̂+ δ̂ ∗ V00 + β̂ ′zz (1.21)
The public insurance enrollment of low-income group children in the post-change period
t = 1 is given by:
y01 = α̂+ γ̂ + δ̂ ∗ V01 + β̂ ′zz (1.22)
According to Eqn. 1.20 the higher-income group enrollment at t = 0 is:
y10 = α̂ + β̂ + δ̂ ∗ V10 + β̂ ′zz (1.23)
Finally, the SCHIP enrollment of the higher-income group in the period after the change
is given by:
y11 = α̂ + β̂ + γ̂ + δ̂ ∗ V11 + β̂ ′zz (1.24)
From these simple, group specific models it is straightforward to see that the estimate
of α captures the probability of enrollment for the lower income group at t = 0 after
controlling for the effect of the premium. β̂ is the difference between the lower income
group enrollment rates in the two periods after controlling for the change in premium.
The estimate of γ gives the change in SCHIP enrollment in response to other time-
varying factors besides the change in the premium. The estimate of the premium
variable coefficient δ supposedly captures the effect of the difference in changes in
premium for the two groups on the probability of enrollment after correcting for group
and time effects. z is a set of other variables including: linear and nonlinear functions
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of family income, a child health indicator, and the age of the child. The z variables can
vary over time and, therefore, impact on the treatment and control groups differently
pre- and post-treatment. By controlling for the z variables, we make the condition
of equal time change for both groups plausible. In addition, the composition of the
treatment and control group must remain stable over the examined period.
I build the multiple-state regression equation by first defining a regression specifi-
cation for State 1 only, which is one of the states with two SCHIP income groups. Let
yit be a (0,1) insurance outcome. The treatment dummy d indexes by 1 all children
in the higher-income group for all states. The time dummy is 1 for all observations in
the period following the month of the premium increase. The variable V is the level of
premium which is time-, group-, and state-varying.
yit1 = α1 + β1d1 + γ1t1 + δ1Vit1 + β
′
z1zit1 + εit1 (1.25)
The regression equation for State 2 is
yit2 = α2 + β2d2 + γ2t2 + δ2Vit2 + β
′
z2zit2 + εit2 (1.26)
Combining data on state 1 and state 2 the two-state regression representation becomes
yits
i∈J1
⋃
J2
= (α1 + β1d1 + γ1t1 + δ1Vit1 + β
′
z1zit1 + εit1) ∗ 1(i ∈ s = 1)
+ (α2 + β2d2 + γ2t2 + δ2Vit2 + β
′
z2zit2 + εit2) ∗ 1(i ∈ s = 1)
(1.27)
Assuming constant premium-, treatment-, and time-effects across states, the multiple-
state difference-in-difference specification becomes
yist
i∈
⋃
Js
=
S∑
s=1
αs ∗ 1(i ∈ s) + βd+ γt + δVist + β
′
zzist + uist (1.28)
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Unlike the individual-state specification (Eqn.1.20), the multiple-state specification
should take into account states’ heterogeneity. To control for it, in Eqn.2.14, I in-
troduce a set of state dummies αs. The specification also explicitly controls for the
time-varying z variables that can impact on the outcome of interest. δ, the coefficient
estimate of the premium variable V , captures the effect of a $1 change in the difference
between the premium increases for the two group on the probability of enrollment.
The high-income groups’ probability of enrollment is constrained to be the same across
states. The inclusion of state-specific dummies allows the control groups’ enrollment
to differ by state.
1.5 Data and Assignment Method
1.5.1 Data
The data for the analysis come from the 2003 panel of the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS). The MEPS provides information on a nationally representative sample
of the non-institutionalized civilian population. It is sponsored by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and the National Center for Health Statistics
(NCHS). The survey has an overlapping panel design, gathering two years of data for
each household. MEPS is designed to produce nationally representative estimates for
insurance coverage, medical expenditure, and a wide range of other health-related and
socioeconomic characteristics. The data can also be used to support behavioral analysis
that informs researchers and policymakers about how the characteristics of individuals
and families, including their health insurance, affect medical care use and spending, as
discussed in Cohen (1997). The MEPS cannot support the estimation of state-specific
models for every state. However, in the context of a multivariate model, the effect of
a state specific variable is identifiable when data on all states are used, as in Hudson,
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Selden and Banthin (2005)
I collected data on SCHIP premium schedules for all states and the District of
Columbia. Premium information was obtained from websites maintained by the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the
American Academy of Pediatrics, and from several published sources by the Maternal
and Child Health Policy Research Center ( Fox, Levtov and McManus (2003), Fox and
Limb (2004) ). The constructed data set has information on premium payments, their
frequency (monthly or annually), and the maximum premium amount that a family
could pay. The premium data are merged to the 2003 full-year consolidated MEPS files
at the state level. The analysis focuses on premium variation across individuals, states
and over time in 2003.
The main focus is on the premiums and insurance status of children aged 18 and
younger. Each state’s premium information is used to assign the premium amount that
the family unit will face to cover a given child for one month. I assess the extent to
which the premium per child in a particular age/income/month/state group affects the
enrollment decision. For states that have introduced a maximum total premium for
families with multiple children, child-specific premiums were constructed by dividing
the maximum premium by the number of children for which the cap becomes effective.
If families were not subject to the family-level maximum, the child-specific premium
was assigned. Enrollment decisions, however, are likely to be made at the family level.
Family-level decision making will take into account the total number of children in
a family unit and the possible decrease in total outlays on premiums because of the
cap. Future work using information on families with only one child will likely provide
a better understanding of family decision making regarding SCHIP enrollment.
In addition, every child that is income- and age-eligible for the SCHIP coverage at
time t is assumed to be in one of three insurance states, namely: 1) SCHIP (public)
24
coverage, 2) private health insurance, or 3) no insurance. A child may leave the SCHIP
in order to take up insurance from another, private source, such as a parent’s employer.
A child eligible for the program can drop out of public insurance, without having any
other form of health insurance and thus become uninsured. Although determining the
share of disenrollment due to substituting with other insurance or losing public coverage
when higher premiums are imposed is key to policy making, it is the beyond scope of
the current paper and is addressed in Nikolova (2008). Defining the three insurance
states between which SCHIP-eligible children can move is of research interest here. The
sample for analysis is limited to children that have one of the three forms of insurance.
Eleven states increased their premiums in 2003. This feature of the data allows us to
look at changes in enrollment over time. My sample for panel analysis includes children
aged 18 and younger with positive full-year weights for 2003. The weight variable, when
applied to the children who participated in that year, allows the researcher to obtain
estimates of child-level changes in the health coverage variable5. I extracted a subset of
children from the full-year population who were included in the survey at the very first
day of 2003. To avoid drawing comparisons across children who entered the MEPS at
different times during that year I also created a subset of children who were available
for interview for all three rounds of data collection. In 2003, six states (Alabama,
Colorado, North Carolina, Nevada, Texas, and Utah) charged annual premiums. Since
one goal of this paper is to trace the monthly changes in enrollment following the
premium increase, these states have been omitted from the panel and cross-sectional
analysis.
Previous national studies of premiums that used repeated cross-sections of the
March supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS) imputed yearly measures of
5A person with a positive full-year weight for 2003 is a key in-scope person who responded for his
or her entire period of 2003 eligibility. A person is considered as in-scope during a round if he or she
is a member of the U.S. civilian, non-institutionalized population at some time during that round.
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public insurance coverage for a number of consecutive years. The MEPS data set pro-
vides a definite advantage to studies that track changes in SCHIP/Medicaid enrollment
with respect to precision of insurance status information. Information on the insurance
coverage of each child is ascertained in the MEPS by asking: “Were you covered by
Medicaid or SCHIP?” each month. However, because of grace periods, insurance cov-
erage studies using the MEPS are susceptible to the timing of the enrollment response
following a premium change. To circumvent the timing issue I compare the January
and December enrollment outcomes of SCHIP eligible children. As no state has a grace
period that would last until December this time span effectively captures the enroll-
ment response in all states that chose to increase their premiums during the year. As
mentioned in Hudson, Banthin and Selden (2004), the MEPS is widely regarded as pro-
viding more accurate and consistent public coverage estimates than the CPS, perhaps
because the MEPS asks numerous detailed questions regarding the presence, source,
and duration of coverage.
The MEPS includes information on children aged 18 and younger who are eligible for
the first or second income group. Public insurance eligibility for each child is assigned
as described below.
1.5.2 Assigning Program Eligibility
Assigning eligibility is pivotal to my analysis.6 The health insurance coverage variable
in the data only indicates that the person has Medicaid or SCHIP coverage. Whether
the coverage is Medicaid or SCHIP is not directly observed and therefore must be
assigned. To assign Medicaid/SCHIP elibility, I use data on family income, family
structure, child age, and state-specific eligibility rules. In all cases, I have attempted
6The paper benefits from the experience and help of Julie Hudson and Jessica Banthin from the
Division of Modeling and Simulation at the Center for Financing, Access and Cost Trends at the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.
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to assign the rules as they would be applied to new applicants.
For the purpose of determining Medicaid or SCHIP eligibility I make use of the
Health Insurance Eligibility Unit (HIEU) definition. This variable identifies family
members who would normally be eligible for family coverage under the adults’ private
health insurance family plans. These families, or HIEUs, comprise adults, their spouses,
and their unmarried natural/adoptive children aged 18 and under. For these traditional
families with parents and children, I calculate annual family income by summing up
the annual wage and salary income for each adult in the HIEU. If there are children
aged 18-24 in an HIEU who are full-time students, their income is omitted from the
family income calculation. However, if the student is a parent and not an older sibling,
her income is counted towards the calculation of family income.
Unmarried minors not living with their natural/adoptive parents are included in
the family of their stepparent, grandparent, or aunt/uncle. State rules vary for the
counting of income and family size for these “nontraditional” families. To simplify,
following previous MEPS studies that use simulated eligibility (Hudson, Selden and
Banthin (2005), Hudson, Banthin and Selden (2004)), I assume that all “nontraditional”
guardians who are both low-income and disabled are included in the unit for both
income and size because this helps the family’s case for being eligible. Otherwise, the
family is treated as a child-only case and the child is eligible for public insurance despite
the income of the adults.
I use the Urban Institute Welfare Rules Database (see Table 2.12) to determine
which states allow minor parents to head their own household. For states that allow
minor parents to head their own household, I follow rules similar to those for nontra-
ditional families: I include the parent/adult relative only if they were both low-income
and disabled. Otherwise the minor parent heads her own household. For states that
do not allow minor parents to head their own household, I include the parent/adult
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relative in the family unit for income and size.
The constructed family income measure is converted into a percentage multiple of
the 2003 poverty guideline, which is the SCHIP income measure for determining eligibil-
ity. Children’s monthly eligibility for public insurance is calculated for the population
of children in the MEPS using state-level rules. Individual eligibility for public insur-
ance is defined by the following mutually exclusive categories: 1) eligible for Medicaid,
2) eligible for SCHIP, and 3) not eligible for public insurance. If a child is age- and
income-eligible for public insurance (Medicaid or SCHIP) and is observed in the data
to have public insurance, then Medicaid coverage is assigned if the family incomes falls
below the income cutoff value separating Medicaid from SCHIP and SCHIP coverage
is assigned if family income is higher than the threshold value. Determining eligibility
on a month-by-month basis incorporates the possibility of a change in state eligibility
rules. Thus transitions of children between income groups or out of SCHIP coverage
could be the result of changes in state eligibility rules and/or premium payments and/or
child age.
A child who was enrolled at any point in a given month is considered a current
enrollee and disenrollees are defined as children enrolled in SCHIP for at least one
month, but not enrolled in SCHIP the subsequent month.
1.5.3 Descriptive Statistics
The sample used in the evaluation of premium effects on SCHIP enrollment consists of
children aged 0 to 18 who are income-eligible for the first or second income group.
Description of Individual States
Table 1.1 shows the family income, premium, age, and the enrollment rate for the
largest state in my data set, referred to as state X . The eligibility rule in this case
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is well known: children under six years with derived income measure, I, such that
I ≤ 134 of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) are eligible for Medicaid, while, for older
children, the income border is set at I = 100 of the FPL. State X has determined
that families with I ≤ 150 of the FPL are responsible for the payment of a $7 monthly
premium. Families with income between 151 and 250 percent of the FPL pay $9 for
the enrollment of their SCHIP eligible children. I find that those enrolled in the first
income group are on average slightly older than those in the second. Family income,
by construction, increases monotonically by group. Table 1.1 compares enrollment for
SCHIP-eligible children for the two income groups. The table shows that enrollment
in the state X program was lower for the high income group than for the low income
group. For states where premiums are increased in 2003 the statistics are based on data
as of the month before the premium change and for states with no temporal variation
in premium statistics are as of January of the same year. There are 270 and 380 eligible
children in the first and second income group respectively.
Sample for Cross-Sectional Analysis
Table 1.1 presents the average enrollment, family income, premium payment, and age
at a point in time for all study states with two income groups except state X. The
table shows that premium payment and enrollment in SCHIP change monotonically
with group, with premium increasing and enrollment decreasing from the low-income
(Group I) to the high-income group (Group II). Children in the lower income group
are on average slightly older than those in the higher income group. There are 317
children in Group I and 664 children in Group II. Statistics are based on data from the
month prior to the premium change for states that increased their premium. I have
used January data for states that did not change their premiums.
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Sample for Longitudinal Analysis
The sample includes children aged 18 and younger with positive full-year weights ap-
plied for 2003. There are 953 children who are income-eligible for Group I and Group
II. Table 1.2 shows the average family income, premium, child age, health status, and
SCHIP enrollment as of January and December of year 2003. Summary statistics are
presented separately for the low- and high-income group. For the low-income group
the average family income, child age and health remain relatively constant over the the
course of the year, but the average premiums increased. The average SCHIP enroll-
ment remained the same over the course of 2003. Summary data for the high-income
group show that public insurance enrollment, family income, age and health status of
the child stay relatively constant over the course of the year, while premium outlays
increase.
1.6 Estimation Results
I present my results in four subsections. First, I discuss simple LOESS results. Second,
I examine the impact of premium on enrollment in the largest state in the data set, state
X. There are two income groups in state X and their beneficiaries are paying different
premiums. These effects are observable and precisely estimated given the data. I also
extend my conclusions by exploring the effect of the premium jump by age group.
Next, I explore the effect of the cross-sectional variation in premiums on enrollment
when data on all states are combined. Finally, I study the impact of premium increases
over time on the SCHIP enrollment rate of children.
To illustrate how discontinuities in the family income assignment rule possibly affect
enrollment decisions, I first plot the enrollment rate as a function of the family income
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index using the LOESS technique, more descriptively known as locally weighted poly-
nomial regression. At each point in the data set, a low-degree polynomial is fitted to
a subset of the data, with explanatory variable values near the point whose response
is being estimated. The polynomial is fitted using weighted least squares which gives
more weight to points near the point whose response is being estimated and less weight
to points further away. The value of the regression function for the point is then ob-
tained by evaluating the local polynomial using the explanatory variable values for that
data point (for detailed discussion on LOESS, see e-Handbook of Statistical Methods,
NIST/SEMATECH (2003)).
1.6.1 A Case Study of the Largest State
State X is the largest state in my data set. Since the assignment rule for each state
has a simple structure, to better understand the influence of premium it is useful to
first separately analyse enrollment in this one state before considering several states
together with cutoffs and premiums at different levels.
As a first exploration for a possible effect of premium payments on enrollment
decisions, I obtain separate LOESS estimates of enrollment in public insurance on
each side of the income cutoff as a function of family income and then display their
scatter plots on the same graph to see how estimated enrollment for each income group
compares at the cutoff. Figure 1.3 shows a scatter diagram of the estimated point-by-
point, locally-weighted linear regressions for each income group as a function of the
family income index for all age-eligible children in state X. The plot presents strong
evidence of a jump at the 150 percentage points of the FPL cutoff between the two
income groups. In addition, I obtain estimates of average enrollment on each side of
the cutoff for children with family income within 15, 20, and 25 percentage points of
the income cutoff score. As shown in Table 1.3 the average enrollment rate of children
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of all ages in the high-income group is estimated to be between 17 to 18.1 percentage
points lower than the enrollment rate for children in the group below the cutoff.
A more exacting demonstration of the cutoff comes from separately analyzing the
enrollment behavior of older children as well as all children. In state X , the cutoff
between SCHIP and Medicaid is set at I = 134 percentage points of the FPL for
children less than six years old, while the threshold for the older children is at a lower
I = 100 percentage points of the FPL. Analysis of older children enrollment is arguably
based on a more uniform set of points. Figure 1.4 for the group of older children, reveals
a clear discontinuous jump at the income cutoff. The effect estimates in Table 1.3 show
that the enrollment of older children in the treatment group decreases by 14.4 – 14.5
percentage points.
Figure 1.3 reveals that the enrollment rate mostly declines with family income. This
result is consistent with the findings of Hadley et al. (2006) that children in families
with higher incomes are more likely to have private coverage than Medicaid or SCHIP
coverage. Figure 1.4, the plot for older children, also demonstrates that the probability
of enrollment after the cutoff decreases monotonically with family income over the
income range of the second income group.
For sufficient sample sizes7 the premium increase estimates for the sample of older
children in state X are negative with magnitude in the range of (−.195;−.462) as
presented in Table 1.4. That is, the increase in premium from $7 to $9 above the
point of discontinuity leads to a decrease in the probability of enrollment in the range
of 19.5 to 46.2 percentage points depending on bandwidth, with the estimate for the
smallest bandwidth being −.462. The estimate based on the smallest bandwidths is
arguably the one with the least bias but the largest standard error. The relatively
large standard errors for these estimates obviously reflect the modest sample sizes on
7Assuming at least 10 observations are needed for the estimation of each parameter.
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which these local estimates are based (as observed in Van der Klaauw (2002)). I specify
the alternative hypothesis that larger premiums are associated with larger declines in
enrollment. My null is that premium-induced disenrollment in the high income group
is as large as premium-induced disenrollment in the lower income group. The estimates
for the −15/ + 15 and −20/ + 20 bandwidths provide significant evidence at the 5
percent level to reject the null. The effect estimates for state X correspond to an
estimated enrollment elasticity8 with respect to group premium evaluated at the mean
in the range of −1.444 to −2.943.
Discontinuity and elasticity estimates for all children are presented in Table 1.4.
The results consistently demonstrate that higher levels of premium are associated with
lower probability of enrollment. In magnitude the premium estimates range from −0.17
for the largest sample to −0.305 for the smallest. The point estimates support an
earlier finding that standard errors decrease as the size of the sample increases. For
the −20/ + 20 interval, at the 5 percent level, I reject the null that the disenrollment
effect for the higher income group is as large as the disenrollment effect for the lower
income children. The elasticity estimates point to a high sensitivity of enrollment to
small premium changes.
The point and elasticity estimates demonstrate that small changes in premium
in State X lead to large disenrollment effects. Whether the $2 increase in monthly
premium per child makes the public insurance alternative unaffordable and the child
loses insurance coverage, or less desirable and the child is switched to private insurance
is an empirical question. Background information suggests that the issue of affordability
8Elasticity is calculated using the mid-point formula
ε =
(
∆EN
(EN1 + EN2)/2
)
×
(
(P1 + P2)/2
∆P
)
(1.29)
The treatment dummy point estimate is ∆EN . Enrollment below the cutoff (EN1) is obtained by
predicting the enrollment probability at the cutoff point using the RD coefficient estimates. Enrollment
above the cutoff (EN2) is just the sum of the EN1 and ∆EN .
33
is particularly acute in State X because of the high cost-of-living which means that low-
and moderate-income families spend a higher share of their family income on essential
items, like food and housing, leaving them fewer resources with which to pay for health
premiums.
1.6.2 Cross-Sectional Estimates
Table 1.5 displays the estimates and standard errors for the premium jump variable J
for three different bandwidths and two samples. Using data on children with family
income within the −15/ + 15 income interval the premium jump is estimated to have
a negative statistically significant effect on SCHIP enrollment (βJ = −0.018). That is,
an additional increase in the high-income group premium of $1 will lead to a decrease
in their SCHIP enrollment of 1.8 percentage points. The effect estimate for the −20/+
20 and −25/ + 25 income intervals is smaller and insignificant. A $1 jump in the
premium across the point of discontinuity is estimated to cause, respectively, a 1.2
and 1 percentage points decline in enrollment for those whose family income is at or
higher than the income cutoff level. The premium jump estimates for the group of older
children are slightly larger. The coefficient estimate β̂J points to a 2.2 to 1.4 percentage
points decrease in public enrollment for individuals just above the cutoff in response to
an additional $1 increase in the premium with the decline for those within +15/− 15
percents of the state-specific cutoff being statistically significant.
The national estimates affirm the single-state findings that higher premiums are
related to a decline in enrollment. In magnitude, the national estimates rank below
the point estimate values for the individual states. To better understand these results,
recall that we assumed that people around the cutoff are the same in terms of all
observable (income) and unobservable characteristics. However, in different states the
cutoffs are at different income levels and the magnitude of the premium jump varies as
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well implying that people near the cutoff are not the same. This heterogeneity in the
cross-sectional analysis leads to weaker results.
For every state with two income groups I have included a state-specific dummy
θs to capture the state heterogeneity. While the premium jump variable controls for
the effect of premium on enrollment in the high-income SCHIP group, θs captures the
effect of all state-specific factors that impact on enrollment in the low-income group,
with the low-income group premium being one of them. For comparison, in the RD
estimation the intercept estimate measures the probability of enrollment for children
with family income below the state cutoff. Testing the joint significance of the state-
specific dummies confirms the hypothesis that the low-income group SCHIP enrollment
varies significantly by state. Additionally, a test of income polynomial significance
shows that, when observations are close to the the state-specific cutoff, family income
does not have a statistically significant effect on the probability of enrollment in the
SCHIP program. Pooled regression with all included states demonstrates that there is
a significant difference between state X and the rest of the states in the sample.
1.6.3 Difference-in-Differences Estimates
Small sample sizes for individual states that increase their premiums over time prevent
DD evaluation of the premium effect at the state level. In the multiple-state analysis
(see Eqn. 2.14) I examine the effect of premium increases using data on children of all
ages as well as children aged 6-18 whose family income puts them within the −15/+15
or −20/+ 20 or −25/+ 25 income intervals (for explanation on the bandwidth choice
see section 1.6.2).
The premium increase estimates for all samples and bandwidths are negative and
significant, as presented in Table 1.6. The estimates obtained with data on all children
point to a decrease in the probability of enrollment of 2.1 to 1.4 percentage points in
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response to a variation of $1 in the difference in changes in premium for the two groups.
Considering only children aged 6-18, I obtain approximately the same estimates for the
premium increase variable. A $1 variation in the difference between the premium
increases for the two groups leads to a decrease of 1.9 to 2.1 percentage point for the
considered intervals. These are significant effects associated with important declines in
SCHIP enrollment.
The estimates of the treatment dummy vary with bandwidth, with the results for
older children being more variable in response to interval choice. The estimate of
β is the difference between lower income group enrollment in the two periods after
controlling for the change in premium. The results point to no effect of treatment
on enrollment rates. The period dummy point estimates reflect the change in SCHIP
enrollment in response to all time-varying factors that are not explicitly controlled for.
The γ estimates are sensitive to bandwidth selection and their impact is not significant.
A joint test of income polynomial significance reveals that income is not a significant
determinant of the probability of being of publicly enrolled when children close to
the cutoff are considered. Testing jointly the statistical importance of state dummies
shows that state-specific factors impact enrollment. Re-estimating the model with all
states with two income groups included in the sample reinforces the cross-sectional
finding that state X differs from the rest of the states, though the conclusions are not
qualitatively different.
1.7 Conclusions
In this paper, I obtain three sets of estimates for the premium increase effect on dis-
enrollment from the State Children’s Health Insurance Program. My main regression-
discontinuity findings provide statistical support for the hypothesis that higher SCHIP
premiums are associated with an increase in disenrollment from the public insurance
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program. The cross-sectional analysis based on the two most homogeneous samples
reveals enrollment decreases in response to a $1 change in the premium jump. The
difference-in-differences premium estimates point to a statistically significant decrease
in public enrollment for children in the higher-income group in response to a $1 variation
in the difference between premium increases for the two groups.
This paper establishes itself in the literature of SCHIP premium evaluation as a
thorough quantitative investigation of SCHIP premium increases. Using the MEPS
survey which is widely regarded as providing the most accurate and consistent public
coverage information, I analyze three different sources of premium variation to evalu-
ate the magnitude of the impact on enrollment rates. While it is important to know
the extent to which efforts designed to provide uninsured children with health cover-
age are hampered by the premium requirement, there is little knowledge about what
happens to the children who disenroll. If a child acquires insurance from a private
source, then this should not be seen as a policy failure because these children do not
become uninsured - it is the lack of any insurance that presents a problem since it is
associated with adverse health outcomes. Future research to determine the extent to
which premium-induced loss of health insurance coverage is an issue for SCHIP will
provide important information about the insurance status of children after they drop
out of public coverage.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics – Cross-Sectional Data
Average family income, premium, age, and public enrollment at a point in time for: (i) all states with two income groups, (ii) all states except
state X, and (iii) state X only
All States All but State X State X
Group Var Mean St. D. N Mean St. D. N Mean St.D. N
Group I Publ enrollment 0.52 0.50 587 0.46 0.50 317 0.59 0.49 270
Income 126.20 14.88 587 128.16 14.51 317 123.91 15.02 270
Premium 5.02 5.52 587 3.33 6.68 317 7 0 270
Child age 10.97 4.36 587 10.90 4.45 317 11.06 4.26 270
Group II Publ enrollment 0.303 0.400 1044 0.27 0.44 664 0.366 0.482 380
Income 189.90 26.52 1044 189.98 25.73 664 189.75 28.03 380
Premium 12.66 10.31 1044 15.75 13.24 664 9 0 380
Child age 9.82 5.10 1044 9.86 5.17 664 9.76 4.99 380
38
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics – Longitudinal Data
Average family income, premium, age, health status, and public enrollment for all states with two income groups as well as for all states
excluding State X as of January and December 2003
All States All but State X
B.Ch. A.Ch. B.Ch. A.Ch.
Group Variable Mean St.D. N Mean St.D. N Mean St.D. N Mean St.D. N
Group I Publ enroll 0.42 0.49 926 0.42 0.49 932 0.37 0.48 670 0.37 0.48 676
Income 142.75 43.27 926 143.03 43.35 932 150.28 47.87 670 150.59 47.87 676
Premium 4.99 7.17 926 5.88 7.16 932 4.22 8.30 670 5.10 8.43 676
Child age 10.16 4.63 926 10.15 4.65 932 10.02 4.87 670 10.01 4.98 676
Health state 3.49 1.64 926 3.48 1.65 932 3.48 1.60 670 3.48 1.61 676
Group II Publ enroll 0.33 0.47 604 0.32 0.47 598 0.26 0.44 283 0.26 0.44 278
Income 191.94 27.91 604 192.29 27.83 598 193.69 29.82 283 194.48 29.63 278
Premium 10.55 7.13 604 11.53 7.53 598 12.29 10.13 283 13.91 10.81 278
Child age 9.88 4.99 604 9.84 4.98 598 9.72 5.21 283 9.64 5.18 278
Health status 3.47 1.69 604 3.46 1.7 598 3.49 1.70 283 3.47 1.71 278
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Table 1.3: Estimated Average Enrollment – State X
LOESS estimates of the probability of SCHIP enrollment of all children in state X
All Ages Age 6 and older
Bandwidth Av. Enr. Effect N Av. Enr. Effect N
B/A B/A B/A B/A B/A
-15/15 0.641/0.460 0.181 89/107 0.633/0.488 0.145 61/84
-20/20 0.632/0.455 0.177 98/127 0.624/0.479 0.145 69/99
-25/25 0.617/0.447 0.170 122/147 0.609/0.465 0.144 93/115
Table 1.4: Public Insurance – Regression-Discontinuity Estimates
RD estimates for the three intervals based on data for the largest state.
(*) – indicates significance at the 5 percent confidence level
Bandwidth Treatment Elasticity N
Below/Above Effect Below/Above
Older Children
-15/15 -0.462** -2.943 61/84
(.275)
-20/20 -0.378** -2.664 69/99
(.220)
-25/25 -0.195 -1.444 93/115
(.193)
All Children
-15/15 -0.305 -2.203 89/107
(.212)
-20/20 -0.292* -2.236 98/127
(.178)
-25/25 -0.170 -1.327 122/147
(.16)
40
Table 1.5: Cross-Sectional Estimates
Premium change estimates for three different bandwidths based on data for all states with two
income groups. (**) - indicates significance at the 5 percent confidence level of the one-tail null there
is the impact of premium on enrollment in the higher income group is larger.
Bandwidth Premium Jump N Premium Jump N
Below/Above All States Below/Above No State X Below/Above
Older Children
-15/15 -0.018 172/125 -0.022** 111/41
(.012) (.012)
-20/20 -0.010 203/145 -0.016 134/46
(.011) (.011)
-25/25 -0.007 247/180 -0.014 154/65
(.01) (.01)
All Children
-15/15 -0.014 212/167 -0.018** 123/60
(.011) (.011)
-20/20 -0.009 256/191 -0.012 158/64
(.009) (.01)
-25/25 -0.007 317/230 -0.01 195/83
( .008) (.008)
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Table 1.6: Difference-in-Differences Estimates
Premium change estimates for three different bandwidths based on data for all states with two income groups. (*) denotes significance at the 5
percent confidence level.
All States All but State X
Bandwidth Prem. Treat. Period N Prem. Treat. Period N
Below/Above Jump Dummy Dummy Below/Above Jump Dummy Dummy Below/Above
Older Children
-15/15 -0.018* 0.051 -0.047 128/142 -0.019* 0.097 -0.030 68/82
(.007) (.01) (.05) (.007) (.098) (.053)
-20/20 -0.019* 0.012 -0.018 152/174 -0.021* 0.076 -0.030 84/106
(.0049) (.082) (.046) (.004) (.086) (.050)
-25/25 -0.017* -0.033 -0.057 188/202 -.020* 0.082 -0.027 90/120
(.005) (.08) (.043) (.004) (.079) (.047)
All Children
-15/15 -0.021* 0.028 -0.063 166/164 -0.021* 0.038 -0.041 82/90
(.005) (.089) (.046) (.005) (.089) (.051)
-20/20 -0.019* 0.032 -0.030 192/210 -0.019* 0.046 -0.036 98/126
(.004) (.076) (.042) (.003) (.082) (.049)
-25/25 -0.014* 0.005 -0.064** 230/250 -0.014* -0.036 -0.043 106/148
(.004) (.072) (.04) (.003) (.085) (.049)
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Table 1.7: Special Rules Imposed on Minor Parents Eligibility
Can be the head of unit Cannot be the head of unit
Alabama Delaware
Alaska Idaho
Arizona Kansas
Arkansas Louisiana
California Maryland
Colorado North Carolina
Connecticut West Virginia
Florida Wisconsin
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Washington D.C.
Wyoming
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Figure 1.1: Production Function of Health Stock
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Figure 1.2: Regression Discontinuity Data
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Figure 1.3: Enrollment Rate - State X
Scatter diagram of the LOESS estimates of the probability of SCHIP enrollment as a function of the family income index for children in state
X. The results are for smoothing parameter=.8, and local polynomial of first degree.
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Figure 1.4: Enrollment Rate for Older Children - State X
Scatter diagram of the LOESS estimates of the probability of SCHIP enrollment as a function of the family income index for children who are 6
years of age and older in state X. The results are for smoothing parameter=.8, and local polynomial of first degree.
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Chapter 2
What Happens to Children Who
Drop Out of SCHIP Coverage?
2.1 Introduction
While higher premiums in the SCHIP have been documented by many researchers to
lead to a decline in enrollment in the program, there is paucity of evidence documenting
what happens to those children after they leave the program. This papers aims to
determine the extent to which premium-induced loss of health insurance coverage is a
problem for the SCHIP program.
Children without health insurance are more likely to go without the necessary
healthcare in times of illness and are less likely to receive preventive treatment (Newacheck
et al., 1998). Some parents may fail to maintain their children’s coverage because they
plan to re-enroll into an insurance plan if an emergency arrives. However, children
with discontinuous coverage are 50 percent more likely to lack a regular source of med-
ical care (Kogan et al., 1995), which is a factor associated with a tenfold increase in
the risk of hospitalizations for preventable health problems. Lack of health insurance
is associated with lower rates of check-ups, vaccination, and follow-up care (Burstin
et al., 1998), and an increase in total medical costs per month (Ku and Ross, 2002).
Clearly, if many children are leaving SCHIP and becoming uninsured, it would pose a
significant public health and policy problem.
Recently, a number of studies on the impact of premium on SCHIP enrollment
appeared in the literature largely in response to the growing number of states that
either increased, or introduced premiums in the early 2000’s. The body of evidence
suggests that higher premiums are associated with a decline in the probability of SCHIP
enrollment, although its estimated magnitude varies quite widely (Shenkman et al.,
2002; Shenkman, Herndon and Vogel, 2006; Kenney, Allison, Costich, Marton and
McFeeters, 2006; Kenney, Costich, Marton and McFeeters, 2006; Marton, 2006; Hadley
et al., 2006; Kenney, Hadley and Blavin, 2006; Nikolova, 2007).
The SCHIP program is targeted at families with incomes above Medicaid levels.
These households are more likely to have access to private insurance. The availability
of cheaper, public insurance has been documented to lead to substitution from private
to public health insurance among SCHIP-eligible children who are already privately
insured. This phenomenon is generally referred to as “crowd-out” 1. SCHIP is created
with a built-in mechanism intended to keep families away from dropping private cov-
erage in favor of public insurance. Perhaps more important in the era of the SCHIP
program is the imposition of non-trivial costs on enrollees, either in the forms of pre-
miums or copayments 2.
Critically, previous research has failed to distinguish between the three different
1Cutler and Gruber (1996) first describe that public eligibility expansions crowd out existing private
insurance coverage. Their central estimates suggest that the number of uninsured only decreased
by one-half as much as the number of publicly insured rose, due to offsetting reductions in private
insurance. Subsequently, there has been a substantial body of literature focusing on the crowd-out
question that has produced mixed results which magnitude is generally below the magnitude of the
findings in Cutler and Gruber (1996).
2The literature in the area suggests, in addition to helping the state budget, avoiding the Medicaid
stigma, and encouraging prudent spending as other reason for having cost-sharing in SCHIP.
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insurance options available to children who are income eligible for the SCHIP public
coverage: a) SCHIP; b) private insurance; and c) no insurance. To make appropriate
recommendations to inform health policy it is necessary to explore the impact of an
increase in public premium paid by the parents of these children on the enrollment
rates for each insurance alternative.
Hadley, Reschovsky, Cunningham, Dubay and Kenney (2006) and Kenney, Hadley
and Blavin (2006) provide estimates of the effect of increasing the public insurance
premium on public enrollment, private enrollment, and uninsurance rates. Using a
multinomial logit regression, the authors find that the odds of having private coverage,
and being uninsured, increase with increases in the premium. Gruber and Simon (2008)
evaluate the impact of total out-of-pocket expenditures and suggest that the financial
barriers in the public program may have an unintended negative impact and lower
the take-up of the uninsured faster than they have lowered crowd-out from private
insurance. Two studies have shown that many children leaving the SCHIP program
are losing any form of insurance coverage (Sommers, 2005; Mitchell, Haber and Hoover,
2006). Sommers (2005) finds that 45.4 percent of children were no longer insured despite
apparently remaining eligible and having no other insurance.
Overall, the current literature provides several insights into the issue of premium-
induced public insurance disenrollment and leaves a few unanswered questions. This
paper contributes to the body of previous work in a number of key ways. First, it
will provide a rigorous quantitative evaluation utilizing the existence of discontinuities
in the states’ programs assignment rules and increases in premium over time. More
importantly, the study will evaluate the impact of higher public insurance premiums on
the transitions of SCHIP-eligible children from public insurance to “no insurance” and
private insurance to determine the extent to which increases in premiums are associated
with a loss of health coverage.
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2.2 State’s Children Health Insurance Program
The SCHIP is similar to Medicaid and is a partnership between federal and state
governments. Both of these programs are run by the individual states according to re-
quirements set by the Federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The SCHIP
law offers states three options for covering uninsured children. States can use SCHIP
funds to cover children through Medicaid-independent children’s health insurance pro-
grams (separate child health programs); (2) expand coverage available under Medicaid
(SCHIP Medicaid expansion programs); or (3) combine both strategies (SCHIP combi-
nation programs). The states with separate child health programs have more latitude
than Medicaid programs, which means they have a great deal of flexibility in their
cost-sharing and plan benefits structure, as well as in eligibility and enrollment mat-
ters. Flexibility is regulated at the federal level and state plans must receive approval
prior to implementation. A novel feature of the SCHIP program is the requirement
that enrollees share in the cost of coverage and services. States can impose premi-
ums on a sliding scale3 for the insurance coverage of children in families with income
above 150 percent of the Federal poverty line (FPL) to encourage parents to take up
employer-provided coverage.
Table 2.1 clearly shows how the states with separate SCHIP or combination pro-
grams are more likely to charge premiums. Only two of the states offering Medicaid
expansion programs charged premiums in 2003. Specifically, in the state of Rhode Is-
land, the cost of covering all SCHIP eligible children in a family was $61 per month.
Wisconsin families that were in the SCHIP programme paid premiums equivalent to 5
percent of their income. In 2003, there was a significant within-state variation in pre-
mium. Twenty states charged different premiums depending on household income with
3In total, premiums, deductibles and other cost-sharing are not to exceed 5 percent of the familys
income.
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families with higher incomes paying more for the coverage of their children. Since states
have freedom in designing the SCHIP program, the cross-state variability in the level of
premium for the low-income groups (base premium) and in the difference between the
high-income and low-income group premiums (premium jump) is substantial. Eight
states also implemented changes in their premiums over the course of 2003. Higher
income families pay higher premiums for the public health insurance of their children
and they also tend to have better access to private insurance coverage. Therefore,
high-income families are less likely to keep their public coverage and also more likely
to substitute to private insurance.
In this paper I investigate the impact of higher SCHIP premiums on private coverage
and uninsurance status. The analysis is based on a unique data set that combines
monthly data on insurance status obtained from the nationally representative Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) with information on SCHIP eligibility rules and
premium levels for all states and the District of Columbia (D.C.).
2.3 Conceptual Framework
The three health insurance alternatives available to a SCHIP-eligible child are: 1)
SCHIP (public) coverage, 2) private health insurance, 3) no insurance. This study
builds on the work of Sommers (2005) who discusses the reasons why a person may
stop participating in SCHIP and elaborates on the possible exit from SCHIP to one of
the other two health insurance categories in response to higher public premiums.
1. Public Health Insurance is provided through the SCHIP program described in
Section 2.2. The purpose of the federal and state authorities is to oversee the
program to provide uninsured children with access to no other form of insurance
with low-cost coverage.
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2. Private Health Insurance: A child may leave the SCHIP after acquiring insurance
from another private source, such as, through a parent’s employer. However, this
should not be seen as a policy failure. These children do not become uninsured,
and as discussed earlier, it is the complete lack of any insurance that is associated
with adverse health outcomes.
3. No Insurance: This category comprises individuals who are still eligible for the
program, but do not have any other form of health insurance, and become unin-
sured. Unlike the previous two categories, this can be viewed as a policy failure,
because based on the legislative intent of eligibility standards, these children
should be enrolled. However, the children are not enrolled and that makes them
susceptible to the adverse health consequences as a result of being uninsured.
SCHIP re-enrollment is free of financial cost, but is not free of other kinds of cost.
Enrollees must certify their eligibility at least once a year to remain in the program,
and for many reasons, enrollees’ parents may not find the process worth their time
or effort. Children will therefore only remain in the program if their parents perceive
that the marginal benefit of SCHIP coverage outweighs the direct and indirect costs of
recertifying. The key issue here is how parents compare SCHIP coverage with the next
best option, which may be private insurance or uninsurance with its combination of
out-of-pocket payments and charity care. Or, parents may, in many cases appropriately,
believe that their children will be able to reenroll in SCHIP in the future should an
emergency arrive. However, instability in public insurance coverage does not promote
appropriate, timely, and cost-effective care which is associated with an increased use
of emergency room visits. The latter are subsidized by the state and can result in
substantial costs for the system.
In terms of costs, most households are required to pay direct charges for premiums.
There are no direct charges for recertification, but the indirect costs can be numerous,
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including, but not limited to, transportation, time lost from work, child care, paperwork
costs, and postage. Furthermore, the entire recertification procedure can be stressful
and demanding of effort and attention, which can be described as psychological costs.
Any factors that lead to a high total cost (direct, indirect, or psychological) of take-up
or a low marginal benefit of SCHIP may contribute to a loss of coverage.
Premium-induced move out from SCHIP should ideally be absorbed into the other
two insurance alternatives. It can be shown that, with no change in the number of
eligible children, the total effect of a premium increase must be zero, where the total
effect is the sum of the partial effects of premium on enrollment in public insurance,
private insurance, and on disenrollment from the program (for technical proof, see
Appendix). The key issue for policy making is to determine the share of substituting
from SCHIP to private insurance or “no insurance” because of higher premiums. It is
the purpose of this paper to establish the magnitudes of the transitions between the
health insurance alternatives available to children that are eligible for SCHIP.
2.4 Methodology
The primary aim of this evaluation is to measure the effect of a variation in premium
across families, states, and over time on SCHIP insurance coverage. This section de-
scribes the theory that underpins the approach to the analysis. The estimation problem
arises because SCHIP-eligible children, depending on their family income, can be as-
signed only to one income group with a fixed premium. No family will be observed
paying both low and high premiums at the same time. Therefore, it is not possible
to determine what would have been the coverage status of the child had the child not
been placed, for example, in the “treatment” group that pays a high premium.
To identify and estimate the treatment effect of interest, comparison must be made
between the outcomes of two groups; a treatment (d = 1) and a control (d = 0). These
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two groups should be as similar as possible in terms of characteristics other than the
treatment itself (Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw, 2001). Estimating the effect of
premium on SCHIP enrollment uses knowledge of discontinuities in the income group
assignment rule and changes in premium levels over time. SCHIP eligible children
can be divided into two income groups on the basis of the interval a calculated family
income index fell into. These intervals are determined by a state-specific income score
I4. Children with household income I at or above I are referred to as the treatment
group and children with income I below I are referred to as the control group.
The actual decision rule for assigning SCHIP eligible children to income groups
varies across states and therefore is difficult to characterize by a simple formula. How-
ever, within an individual state, the assignment rule is fairly simple and easy to imple-
ment. One such rule, adopted by the largest state in the data set referred to as state
X , states that children are assigned to the following two groups based on their family
income: children with family income below 150 percent of the federal poverty line fall
into the low income group and children with income at or above 150 of the federal
poverty line are assigned to the high income group. The premiums differ by income
group. Higher income families pay more for the insurance of their children. However,
within an income group, the premium payment is fixed. In the case of state X , parents
pay a premium of $7 per month for the SCHIP insurance coverage of a child assigned to
the low income group and $9 for a child in the high income group. Thus, the premium
payment, as a function of I, contains a jump at the cutoff between the first and second
income intervals.
4There can be up to three income cutoffs in a certain state, because of sample size restrictions, the
premium effect is estimated based on the the first income cutoff only.
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2.4.1 Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design
Assignment to groups based on family income makes the treatment and control group
very different, at least in terms of their average income value. This is in sharp contrast
with pure randomization. It is assumed that, at the cutoff, the two groups are the same
in terms of all observable and unobservable aspects, except the treatment status. This
assumption is in agreement with the Regression-Discontinuity (RD) Design framework
that is applied to the evaluation of private enrollment and uninsurance. The sharp
RD is used because all children with I ≥ I are assigned to the treatment group. The
limitation of using cutoff randomization is that, the number of data points just below
and just above the cutoff is often not large enough to produce reliable estimates. This
limitation is a key motivation to explore the premium effects on participation beyond
the immediate vicinity of the cutoff. Increasing the interval around the cutoff is likely
to produce a bias in the effect estimate because the premium fee is determined by I that
itself has been documented to influence the private enrollment and drop-out decision.
Since I is the only systematic determinant of the premium fee, the inclusion of a smooth
function g(Ii) which is continuous at the income cutoff will solve the endogeneity issue,
provided that the regression specification includes a treatment dummy d and focuses
on observations that are within a narrow interval around the cutoff. In addition, it
is assumed that the “true” functional form of I can be approximated by some known
polynomial. Therefore, an additional assumption is that g(I) = 0 when I = I. The
model for the observed enrollment in private insurance and uninsurance is specified as:
yi = α + βd1
(
Ii ≥ I
)
+ g(Ii) + εi, i ∈ J (2.1)
where 1
(
Ii ≥ I
)
is an indicator function denoting assignment of child i to the high-
income group and α is an intercept. J denotes the subsample such that I − h < Ii <
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I + h and h is the bandwidth. The bandwidth around the cutoff determines the share
of the sample included in the analysis, with smaller bandwidths producing less biased
estimates with higher standard errors. In this notation, the estimate of the intercept αˆ
captures the impact of the base premium on the outcome of interest for those eligible
for the lower-income group for the case when I = I. In general, the effect for the lower-
income group with income I˜ is α+g(I˜). The parameter βd measures the discontinuity in
the expected enrollment for individuals on both sides of the income cutoff between two
income groups, or the vertical distance at I = I. For individuals in the higher-income
group with income I˜, the effect is α+ βd + g(I˜).
2.4.2 Cross-Sectional Model
The premium levels for the low-income and high-income groups differ not only within
the state, a feature explored so far in the study, but also across states. Since state X is
relatively larger in size compared to the entire sample, it is necessary to: (1) combine
data on states with two income groups excluding state X. (2) check the robustness of
results for the sample of all states including state X. Defining the sample in this way is
equivalent to splitting all available data into two distinct groups and running separate
regressions for each of them.
In the multiple state specification it is assumed that people around the state-specific
cutoffs should be the same in terms of their observable (income) and unobservable
characteristics. The first step in specifying a multiple-state regression equation for the
impact of premium is to define a regression equation for state 1. State 1 is one of the
states with two SCHIP income groups. In the individual-state regression specification
variable J1 is a dummy that controls for the impact of the higher-income group premium
on public insurance enrollment. The estimate of the constant θ1 captures the impact of
state-specific factors affecting the enrollment of the lower-income group. One of these
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factors is premium. The state 1 regression equation is specified as:
yi1 = θ1 + β1J1 + g(Ii1) + ui1 (2.2)
The regression equation for state 2 is:
yi2 = θ2 + β2J2 + g(Ii2) + ui2 (2.3)
Combining across-state data, by imposing linear and constant premium effects as
well as constant income effects across states, the two-state regression model represen-
tation is:
yis
i∈J1
⋃
J2
= θ1 ∗ 1(i ∈ 1) + θ2 ∗ 1(i ∈ 2) + β
2∑
s=1
Js + g(Ii) + uis (2.4)
where Js is the magnitude of the premium stepped-increase above the point of dis-
continuity for state s. The estimate of β captures the impact of a $1 variation in
the premium increase on private insurance enrollment/uninsurance of children whose
family income is at, or above, the state income cutoff. Because we assume constant
premium effects across states, the effect estimate β is the same for state 1 and state
2. θ1 and θ2 are state dummies controlling respectively for the impact of state 1 and
state 2 specific factors. These are factors that determine the probability of enrollment
into the first group such as the low premium fee. J1
⋃
J2 denotes the subsamples from
both states used in the analysis. For state 1, I1−h < Ii1 < I1+h, I1 is state 1 specific
income cutoff. For state 2, I2 − h < Ii2 < I2 + h with I2 the income cutoff. h is the
bandwidth around the cutoff.
58
Including multiple states in the evaluation of across-state premium variation modi-
fies the two-state regression specification as follows:
yis
i∈
⋃
Js
=
S∑
s=1
θs ∗ 1(i ∈ s) + β
S∑
s=1
Js + g(Iis) + uis (2.5)
Recall that the underlying assumption for the cross-sectional regression specification is
that the premium increase effect is linear and proportional for all states. The β estimate
is interpreted as the effect of a $1 variation in the jump in premium on enrollment of
children whose family income places them just above the cutoff. While the high-income
groups are constrained to differ only in their premiums, the inclusion of state specific
dummies allows the control groups to differ across states regardless of the income cutoff
value for the jump in the premium.
2.4.3 Difference-in-Differences Design
A “before-after” (BA) design is related to the RD design. The BA design assumes the
discontinuity takes place in the time dimension. The control response comes from a pre-
defined time period before the treatment and the treatment response comes from the
time period after the treatment. To identify the impact of premium on enrollment, the
child insurance participation is compared before and after the month of the premium
change (t). With t denoting months, dt = 1[t ≥ t]. For a BA design to be effective the
break should be defined clearly and the effect should be measured quickly before other
covariates change. This is analogous to the borderline randomization of RD, where
in a small temporal neighborhood, the time period just before the treatment should
be compared to the time period just after the treatment, because other changes are
unlikely to take place over the short term.
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SCHIP families that fail to pay their premiums will lose insurance coverage. How-
ever, families that renege on their current payments are often provided with a grace
period5 before their child becomes disenrolled. The length of this “grace” period varies
by state. This implies that treatment may take place gradually over time which makes
it difficult to separate the treatment effect from the “time effect” due to other factors
that vary over the same period.
The existence of grace periods with varying length in the SCHIP program motivates
the use of “Difference-in-Differences” (DD) method. The advantage of DD over BA
approach is that there is a control group, which incurs the time effect but not the
treatment effect. Using the control group, the treatment can be identified even if the
treatment takes place gradually. In a DD design, the treatment is given only to a certain
group of individuals, and those left out constitute the control group. In contrast, in a
BA (and RD) design, everybody gets the treatment without exception. Hence, there is
no contemporary control group in a BA design. Only the treatment group’s past before
the treatment is available as a control group. In addition, the parameter estimates from
the DD design will vary depending on the length of the time period considered.
To explore the temporal variation created by premium changes over time, I compare
the private enrollment and uninsurance outcomes of children for states with two income
groups. Widening the window around the time cutoff shifts the identification from a
local regression-discontinuity to a global difference-in-differences one, and includes only
the observations that are close to the state income cutoff. Let yit be a (0,1) insurance
outcome, respectively, for the private coverage and uninsurance. As in the RD design,
the high-income group from within the state is selected as “treatment” (d = 1) and is
assumed to differ from the control group in the the amount of the premium fee. By
5A “grace” period is a specified period of time during which children can continue to access services
after the payment due date. This allows families who fall behind in paying their premiums time to
catch up on past payments before their children lose coverage.
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choosing the low-income group within the state as control, which is presumably similar
to the high-income group in some state-specific unobserved aspects, these unobserved
aspects are controlled for. I also define a binary time variable t that takes a value of
either 0 or 1 depending on whether the child is observed before or after the premium
change. The variable V is the premium level which varies over time and by income
group. This leads to:
yit = α + βd+ γt+ δVit + β
′
zzit + εit (2.6)
The DD regression specification implies that, for the average child, the lower-income
group enrollment in private insurance/uninsurance in the period before the premium
change t = 0 is given by:
y00 = α̂+ δ̂ ∗ V00 + β̂ ′zz (2.7)
The insurance enrollment of low-income group children in the post-change period t = 1
is given by:
y01 = α̂+ γ̂ + δ̂ ∗ V01 + β̂ ′zz (2.8)
According to Eqn. 2.6 the higher-income group enrollment at t = 0 is:
y10 = α̂ + β̂ + δ̂ ∗ V10 + β̂ ′zz (2.9)
Finally, the private enrollment/uninsurance outcome of the higher-income group in the
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period after the change is given by:
y11 = α̂ + β̂ + γ̂ + δ̂ ∗ V11 + β̂ ′zz (2.10)
From these simple, group specific models it is straightforward to see that the estimate
of α captures the probability of enrollment of the lower income group at t = 0 after
controlling for the effect of premium. β̂ is the difference between lower-income group
enrollment in the two periods after controlling for the change in premium. The estimate
of γ gives the change in private enrollment/uninsurance in response to other time
varying factors besides the change in premium. The estimate of the premium variable
coefficient δ captures the effect of the difference in changes in premium for the two
group on the insurance outcome after correcting for group and time effects. z is a set of
other variables including linear and nonlinear function of family income, child’s health
indicator, and child’s age. The z variables can vary over time and, therefore, impact the
treatment and control groups differently pre- and post-treatment. By controlling for
the z variables, we make the condition of equal time change for both groups plausible.
In addition, the composition of the treatment and control group must remain stable
over the examined period.
I build the multiple-state regression equation by first defining a regression specifi-
cation for State 1 only, which is one of the states with two income groups. Let yit be
a (0,1) insurance outcome. The treatment dummy d is 1 for all children in the higher
income group for all states. The time dummy is 1 for all observations in the period
following the month of the premium increase. The variable V is the level of premium
which varies by time, group, and state.
yit1 = α1 + β1d1 + γ1t1 + δ1Vit1 + β
′
z1zit1 + εit1 (2.11)
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The regression equation for State 2 is given by:
yit2 = α2 + β2d2 + γ2t2 + δ2Vit2 + β
′
z2zit2 + εit2 (2.12)
Combining data on state 1 and state 2 the two-state regression representation becomes:
yits
i∈J1
⋃
J2
= (α1 + β1d1 + γ1t1 + δ1Vit1 + β
′
z1zit1 + εit1) ∗ 1(i ∈ s = 1)
+ (α2 + β2d2 + γ2t2 + δ2Vit2 + β
′
z2zit2 + εit2) ∗ 1(i ∈ s = 2)
(2.13)
Assuming constant premium, treatment, and time effects across states, the multiple-
state difference-in-difference specification becomes
yist
i∈
⋃
Js
=
S∑
s=1
αs ∗ 1(i ∈ s) + βd+ γt + δVist + β
′
zzist + uist (2.14)
Unlike the individual-state specification (Eqn.2.6), the multiple-state specification should
take into account states’ heterogeneity. To control for it, in Eqn.2.14, I introduce a set
of state dummies αs. The specification also explicitly controls for the time-varying z
variables that can impact on the outcome of interest (private insurance and uninsur-
ance). The δ coefficient estimate of the premium variable V captures the effect of a
$1 change in the difference between premium increases for the two group on the insur-
ance outcome. The high-income group’s insurance outcome is constrained to be the
same across states. The inclusion of state specific dummies allows the control groups’
enrollment to be different in the different states.
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2.5 Data and Assignment Method
2.5.1 Data
The data for the analysis come from the 2003 panel of the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS). The MEPS provides information on a nationally representative sample
of the non-institutionalized civilian population. It is sponsored by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and the National Center for Health Statistics
(NCHS). The survey has an overlapping panel design, gathering two years of data for
each household. MEPS is designed to produce nationally representative estimates for
insurance coverage, medical expenditure, and a wide range of other health-related and
socioeconomic characteristics. The data can also be used to support behavioral analysis
that informs researchers and policymakers about how the characteristics of individuals
and families, including their health insurance, affect medical care use and spending, as
discussed in Cohen (1997). The MEPS cannot support the estimation of state-specific
models for every state. However, in the context of a multivariate model, the effect of
a state specific variable is identifiable when data on all states are used, as in Hudson,
Selden and Banthin (2005)
I collected data on SCHIP premium schedules for all states and the District of
Columbia. Premium information was obtained from websites maintained by the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the
American Academy of Pediatrics, and from several published sources by the Maternal
and Child Health Policy Research Center ( Fox, Levtov and McManus (2003), Fox and
Limb (2004) ). The constructed data set has information on premium payments, their
frequency (monthly or annually), and the maximum premium amount that a family
could pay. The premium data are merged to the 2003 full-year consolidated MEPS files
at the state level. The analysis focuses on premium variation across individuals, states
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and over time in 2003.
The main focus is on the premiums and insurance status of children aged 18 and
younger. Each state’s premium information is used to assign the premium amount that
the family unit will face to cover a given child for one month. I assess the extent to
which the premium per child in a particular age/income/month/state group affects the
enrollment decision. For states that have introduced a maximum total premium for
families with multiple children, child-specific premiums were constructed by dividing
the maximum premium by the number of children for which the cap becomes effective.
If families were not subject to the family-level maximum, the child-specific premium
was assigned. Enrollment decisions, however, are likely to be made at the family level.
Family-level decision making will take into account the total number of children in
a family unit and the possible decrease in total outlays on premiums because of the
cap. Future work using information on families with only one child will likely provide
a better understanding of family decision making regarding SCHIP enrollment.
Eleven states increased their premiums in 2003. This feature of the data allows us
to look at changes in private insurance and uninsurance rates over time. My sample
for panel analysis includes children aged 18 and younger with positive full-year weights
for 2003. The weight variable, when applied to the children who participated in that
year, allows the researcher to obtain estimates of child-level changes in the health
coverage variable6. I extracted a subset of children from the full-year population who
were included in the survey at the very first day of 2003. To avoid drawing comparisons
across children who entered the MEPS at different times during that year I also created a
subset of children who were available for interview for all three rounds of data collection.
In 2003, six states (Alabama, Colorado, North Carolina, Nevada, Texas, and Utah)
6A person with a positive full-year weight for 2003 is a key in-scope person who responded for his
or her entire period of 2003 eligibility. A person is considered as in-scope during a round if he or she
is a member of the U.S. civilian, non-institutionalized population at some time during that round.
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charged annual premiums. Since one goal of this paper is to trace the monthly changes
in enrollment following the premium increase, these states have been omitted from the
panel and cross-sectional analysis.
Previous national studies of premium that use repeated cross-sections of the March
supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS) have imputed yearly measures of
public insurance coverage for a number of consecutive years. With respect to precision
of insurance status information, the MEPS data set provides a definite advantage to
studies that track changes in public/private health insurance rates. Information on the
insurance coverage of each child is ascertained on the MEPS by asking: ”Were you
covered by Medicaid or SCHIP” and ”Were you covered by private insurance” each
month. However, because of grace periods, insurance coverage studies using the MEPS
are susceptible to the timing of the enrollment response following a premium change. To
circumvent the timing issue I compare the January and December enrollment outcomes
of SCHIP eligible children. As no state has a grace period that would last until Decem-
ber this time span effectively captures the enrollment response in all states that chose
to increase their premiums during the year. As mentioned in Hudson, Banthin and
Selden (2004), the MEPS is widely regarded as providing more accurate and consistent
public coverage estimates than the CPS, perhaps because the MEPS asks numerous
detailed questions regarding the presence, source, and duration of coverage.
The MEPS includes information on children aged 18 and younger who are eligible for
the first or second income group. Public insurance eligibility for each child is assigned
as described below.
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2.5.2 Assigning SCHIP Eligibility and Insurance Plan
Participation
Assigning eligibility is pivotal to my analysis.7 The health insurance coverage variable in
the data only indicates that the person has Medicaid or SCHIP coverage. Whether the
coverage is Medicaid or SCHIP is not directly observed and therefore must be assigned.
To assign Medicaid/SCHIP elibility, I use data on family income, family structure, child
age, and state-specific eligibility rules. In all cases, I have attempted to assign the rules
as they would be applied to new applicants. Given assigned eligibility and observed
private insurance and uninsurance status, private coverage for SCHIP-eligible children
is recorded.
For the purpose of determining Medicaid or SCHIP eligibility I make use of the
Health Insurance Eligibility Unit (HIEU) definition. This variable identifies family
members who would normally be eligible for family coverage under the adults’ private
health insurance family plans. These families, or HIEUs, comprise adults, their spouses,
and their unmarried natural/adoptive children aged 18 and under. For these traditional
families with parents and children, I calculate annual family income by summing up
the annual wage and salary income for each adult in the HIEU. If there are children
aged 18-24 in an HIEU who are full-time students, their income is omitted from the
family income calculation. However, if the student is a parent and not an older sibling,
her income is counted towards the calculation of family income.
Unmarried minors not living with their natural/adoptive parents are included in
the family of their stepparent, grandparent, or aunt/uncle. State rules vary for the
counting of income and family size for these “nontraditional” families. To simplify,
7The paper benefits from the experience and help of Julie Hudson and Jessica Banthin from the
Division of Modeling and Simulation at the Center for Financing, Access and Cost Trends at the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.
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following previous MEPS studies that use simulated eligibility (Hudson, Selden and
Banthin (2005), Hudson, Banthin and Selden (2004)), I assume that all ”nontraditional”
guardians who are both low-income and disabled are included in the unit for both
income and size because it would help the family’s case for being eligible. Otherwise,
the family is treated as a child-only case and the child is eligible for public insurance
despite the income of the adults.
Unmarried minors not living with their natural/adoptive parents are included in
the family of their stepparent, grandparent, or aunt/uncle. State rules vary for the
counting of income and family size for these “nontraditional” families. To simplify,
following previous MEPS studies that use simulated eligibility (Hudson, Selden and
Banthin (2005), Hudson, Banthin and Selden (2004)), I assume that all “nontraditional”
guardians who are both low-income and disabled are included in the unit for both
income and size because this helps the family’s case for being eligible. Otherwise, the
family is treated as a child-only case and the child is eligible for public insurance despite
the income of the adults.
I use the Urban Institute Welfare Rules Database (see Table 2.12) to determine
which states allow minor parents to head their own household. For states that allow
minor parents to head their own household, I follow rules similar to those for nontra-
ditional families: I include the parent/adult relative only if they were both low-income
and disabled. Otherwise the minor parent heads her own household. For states that
do not allow minor parents to head their own household, I include the parent/adult
relative in the family unit for income and size.
The constructed family income measure is converted into a percentage multiple of
the 2003 poverty guideline, which is the SCHIP income measure for determining eligibil-
ity. Children’s monthly eligibility for public insurance is calculated for the population
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of children in the MEPS using state-level rules. Individual eligibility for public insur-
ance is defined by the following mutually exclusive categories: 1) eligible for Medicaid,
2) eligible for SCHIP, and 3) not eligible for public insurance. If a child is age- and
income-eligible for public insurance (Medicaid or SCHIP) and is observed in the data
to have public insurance, then Medicaid coverage is assigned if the family incomes falls
below the income cutoff value separating Medicaid from SCHIP and SCHIP coverage
is assigned if family income is higher than the threshold value. Further, if an SCHIP
eligible child is reported to have private insurance, the private insurance coverage is
assigned. Lastly, if there is no record of public/private coverage, the SCHIP-eligible
child is treated as uninsured. Determining eligibility on a month-by-month basis incor-
porates the possibility of a change in state eligibility rules. Thus transitions of children
between income groups or out of SCHIP coverage into private insurance or “no insur-
ance” could be the result of changes in state eligibility rules and/or premium payments
and/or child age.
A child who was enrolled at any point in a given month in a public or private insur-
ance is considered a current enrollee and disenrollees are defined as children enrolled
in SCHIP or private plan for at least one month, but not enrolled in the subsequent
month.
2.5.3 Descriptive Statistics
The sample used in the evaluation of public premium effects on private insurance en-
rollment or uninsurance consists of children age 0 to 18 who are income-eligible for the
first or second SCHIP income group.
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Description of Individual States
Table 2.2 shows the public enrollment, private enrollment, and uninsurance rate, family
income, premium, and child age for the largest state in my data set, state X . The
eligibility rule in this case is well known: children less than six years old with I ≤ 134
of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) are eligible for Medicaid, while, for older children,
the income border is set at I = 100 of the FPL. State X has determined that families
with I ≤ 150 of the FPL are responsible for the payment of $7 monthly premium.
Families with income between 151 and 250 percent of FPL pay $9. I find that children
enrolled in the lower income group are, on average, older than children in the higher
income group. Family income, by construction, increases monotonically by group.
Table 2.2 shows that the private insurance enrollment rate, while public insurance and
uninsurance rates decrease from the low-income (Group I) to the high-income group
(Group II). The statistics are based on data as of the month before the premium change
for states that increased their premium. For states where premiums are increased in
2003 the statistics are based on data as of the month before the premium change and
for states with no temporal variation in premium statistics are as of January of the
same year. There are 270 and 380 eligible children in the first and second income group
respectively.
Sample for the Cross-Sectional Analysis
Table 2.2 presents the average enrollment rates, family income, premium payment, and
child age at a point in time for all study states with two income groups. The table shows
that premium payment and income increase monotonically with group. Children in the
low-income group are on average older than children in the high-income group. Children
from low-income families have higher participation rates in public health insurance.
They have lower rates of private insurance and higher uninsurance rates. There are
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317 children who are income-eligible for the first income group and 664 for the second.
All statistics are based on data as of the month before any program change took place
or as of January for the states that did not implement any new features in their public
insurance programs.
Sample for the Longitudinal Analysis
The longitudinal sample includes children aged 18 and younger with positive full-year
weights applied for 2003. There are 1631 children who are income-eligible for the first
and second income group. Table 2.3 shows the average family income, premium, child
age, health status, and public, and private coverage , and “no insurance” as of January
and December of 2003. Summary statistics are presented separately for the low- and
high-income group. For the low-income group the average family income, child age
and health remain approximately the same over the course of the year. Due to the
implemented premium changes in some states the average premium increases by $ 0.88
or 21 percent. The average private, public, and uninsurance rates stayed roughly the
same. Summary data for the high-income group show that income, child age, and
health remained about the same over the course of the year, while premium goes up
by about $1.62, that is by approximately 13 percent. Public, private, and uninsurance
rates do not change.
2.6 Estimation Results
I begin my analysis of public premium crowd-out by graphically representing private
enrollment and uninsurance in the largest state in my data set, referred here as state
X . I obtain separate LOESS8 estimates of enrollment on each side of the cutoff as a
8LOESS is a technique that fits, at each point in the data set, a low-degree polynomial to a subset
of the data, with explanatory variable values near the point whose response is being estimated. The
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function of family income and then display the scatter plots on the same graph to see
how estimated enrollment for each income group compares at the cutoff. Figure 2.1
shows estimated private enrollment as a function of the family income index for all
children with family incomes from 100 to 250 percentage points of the FPL. The plot
demonstrates a clear discontinuity in the probability of private insurance enrollment at
the 150 percent cutoff where premium jumps from $7 to $9 dollars. Figure 2.1 suggests
that families of SCHIP-eligible children that are charged more for their public insurance
coverage are more likely to be enrolled in private insurance. Table 2.4 shows that, for
children above the cutoff, the probability of private enrollment increases by 32 or 33
percent depending on bandwidth. Reversing the logic of these findings, they indicate
that lower public premiums are associated with lower private insurance take-up.
Figure 2.2 provides a LOESS representation of the estimated point-by-point, locally-
weighted linear regression of uninsurance as a function of the family income index for
all age-eligible children in state X . The plot presents strong evidence of a downward
jump in uninsurance at the cutoff at the 150 percentage points of the FPL between the
two income groups. I obtain estimates of average uninsurance on each side of the cutoff
for different intervals around the income threshold. Average uninsurance is estimated
to be 15 percentage points lower for children whose household income places them to
right at the cutoff or just above it (see, Table 2.5).
A more exacting demonstration of the cutoff comes from separately analyzing the
enrollment behavior of older children in different age groups. Age group analysis of
enrollment is thus arguably based on a more uniform set of points. Figure 2.3 for
the group of older children reveals a clear discontinuous jump at the income cutoff.
polynomial is fitted using weighted least squares, giving more weight to points near the point whose
response is being estimated and less weight to points further away. The value of the regression function
for the point is then obtained by evaluating the local polynomial using the explanatory variable values
for that data point
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Table 2.4 presents LOESS estimates of the private coverage response to premium. The
magnitude of the jump in enrollment for older children is between 32 and 33 percentage
points, the same as the decline when the enrollment response of all children is analyzed.
Consistent with the findings of Hadley et al. (2006), Figures 2.1 and 2.3 reveal that
private insurance coverage increases with family income. Because of the small number
of observations on younger children, conclusions about the presence of discontinuity and
its magnitude are largely speculative. For this reason, I focus on studying enrollment
of all children and older children only.
Table 2.5 shows that the probability of not having any insurance decreases by 17 –
18 percent. The decline in the estimated uninsurance rate for older children is slightly
larger than the estimated decrease for all children.
2.6.1 Regression-Discontinuity Estimates
The observed private insurance and uninsurance outcomes can be evaluated more for-
mally by constructing and evaluating regression discontinuity of the two outcomes of
interest for children whose income- and age-dependent eligibility places them just be-
low and just above the cutoff between the first and second SCHIP income groups. The
regression discontinuity estimates of private enrollment for state X are presented in
Table 2.6. Looking first at the enrollment model, when the evaluation is restricted to
children aged six and older and to samples with at least 50 observations to estimate
the five coefficients of the RD model, the regression-adjusted estimates of premium on
private enrollment are very close to the LOESS results. The premium estimates, as
premium jumps from $7 to $9, point to an increase in the probability of being covered
by private insurance with magnitude in the range of (.272; .366). I test the null hy-
pothesis that premium-induced private enrollment for the high income group is as large
as premium-induced private enrollment in the lower-income group. The estimates for
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the −25/+ 25 interval provide significant evidence at the 5 percent level to reject the
null. They show that private insurance take-up increases as the premium payments for
SCHIP go up. The estimates for the sample of all children are smaller, more variable
and less closely aligned with the LOESS results in comparison to the findings for older
children. For the sample of all children, the premium effect is positive everywhere and
significant for the “−25/+25” interval. The effect estimates for state X correspond to
an estimate of enrollment elasticity9 with respect to group premium evaluated at the
mean in the range of (4.626 to 6.680) for children age six and older. For the sample of
all children, the estimate range is from 1.001 to 4.47 indicating that the cross elasticity
of demand is large and positive. Thus increases in public premiums can successfully
prevent the substitution of private health insurance for public. At the same time, these
findings suggest, that declines in the SCHIP premiums will lead to disproportionately
larger declines in private coverage.
The direction of the regression-discontinuity estimates for uninsurance vary with
bandwidth. For the −15/+ 15 and −20/+ 20 of the two different samples considered,
they point to an increase in the probability of having no health insurance coverage.
The results for the −25/ + 25 bandwidth switch sign. All estimates are statistically
insignificant.
The regression discontinuity estimates of $1 change in SCHIP premiums on public
insurance (reported in Nikolova (2007)), private insurance and uninsurance sum up to
0 which, as demonstrated in the Appendix, should be the case if a child could hold
either SCHIP insurance or private insurance or be uninsured. Altogether, the three
9Elasticity is calculated using the mid-point formula
ε =
(
∆EN
(EN1 + EN2)/2
)
×
(
(P1 + P2)/2
∆P
)
(2.15)
The treatment dummy point estimate is ∆EN . Enrollment below the cutoff (EN1) is obtained by
predicting the enrollment probability at the cutoff point using the RD coefficient estimates. Enrollment
above the cutoff (EN2) is just the sum of the EN1 and ∆EN .
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sets of state X discontinuity estimates suggest that higher premiums for the public
health insurance are associated with a statistically significant drop in the rate of public
insurance for children whose family income places them at the income cutoff between
the two income groups or just above it (Nikolova, 2007). The results also indicate that
there is a statistically significant increase in the probability of private insurance take-
up for the higher income children. No significant change in the rate of uninsurance is
found. Thus risk-averse parents (as most parents are with respect to the health of their
children) in State X will seek the protection of health insurance against the event of
illness of a child.
2.6.2 Cross-Sectional Estimates
My second set of estimates is based on pooled data on multiple states from the 2003
MEPS. The results for the −15/ + 15, −20/ + 20, and −25/ + 25 bandwidth are
summarized in Table 2.8. These pooled data results suggest that an additional variation
of $1 in the jump in premium from the low-income to the high-income group leads to a
statistically significant increase in the probability of private insurance for those whose
income places them within 15, 20, and 25 percentage points of FPL above the cutoff
with the magnitude of the increase, respectively, 4.6, 2.9, and 3.0 percentage points.
The jump estimates for all children (3.4, 2.2, 2.0) are smaller in magnitude. Compared
to the regression-discontinuity results based on data for State X only, the cross-sectional
results are much smaller in magnitude. To understand better these findings, recall that
we assumed that people around the cutoff are the same in terms of all observable
(income) and unobservable characteristics. However, in the different states the cutoffs
are at different income levels and the magnitude of the premium jump varies as well
implying that people near the cutoff are not the same. This heterogeneity in the cross-
sectional analysis leads to weaker results.
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The cross-sectional estimates affirm the single-state findings that higher premiums
should be successful at preventing private insurance crowding-out. The pooled data
results provide additional support for the hypothesis that private insurance enrollment
response is larger for the group of older children. In addition, for every state with
two income groups I have included a state-specific dummy θs to capture the state het-
erogeneity. Testing the joint significance of the state-specific dummies shows that the
low-income group SCHIP enrollment varies significantly by state. Additionally, a test
of income polynomial significance shows that, when observations are close to the cutoff,
family income does not have a statistically significant effect on the probability of enroll-
ment in private health insurance. Similar results are found in the cross-sectional eval-
uation of public premium on SCHIP enrollment (see Nikolova (2007)). Re-estimating
the model with data on all states shows that state X is different from the rest of states
in the sample. One possible explanation for this observation could lie in the special
degree of legal protection that State X workers on private insurance plans enjoy making
the option a desirable alternative for low- and moderate-income workers when they are
faced with higher premiums for SCHIP. In particular, State X has made it an unfair
labor practice for employers to change the employee-employer share-of-cost ratio based
upon the employee’s wage base or job classification in order that the employee enroll
in SCHIP. It also prohibits employers from making any modification of coverage for
employees and their dependents in order that they enroll in the public insurance pro-
gram. The law also prohibits the employer from encouraging employees to drop group
coverage in favor of the SCHIP program. State X has also introduced a relatively short
period of 3 months before eligible children can enroll in SCHIP reducing the cost of
switching between insurance alternatives.
The cross-sectional estimates for the impact of public premium on being uninsured
in Table 2.9 point consistently to a decline in the probability of having no coverage in
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response to higher premiums for the SCHIP insurance. The estimate for the −15/+15
and −25/ + 25 bandwidth for the sample of older children points to statistically sig-
nificant decline in the rate of uninsurance as public premiums increase. The coefficient
estimate for the −15/+ 15 bandwidth for the sample of all children demonstrates sig-
nificance of the hypothesis that SCHIP premium hikes lead to higher private insurance
take up for those above the cutoff than those below it. Testing jointly the significance of
income polynomial reveals that income does not have an impact on probability of being
uninsured. A joint test of the significance of all state dummies reveals that there is
no significant variation across state in the probability of being uninsured. The robust-
ness test demonstrates that including state X in the estimation changes the coefficient
estimates.
Taken together, these two sets of estimates along with the cross-sectional findings for
public insurance reported in Nikolova (2007) point to a statistically significant increase
in the probability of being privately insured for the higher-income, higher-premium
paying children, and to a statistically significant decline in uninsurance for older chil-
dren within −15/+15 and −25/+25 of the state-specific FPL as well as for all children
within −25/+ 25 bandwidth.
2.6.3 Longitudinal Estimates
I also evaluate the impact of SCHIP premium variation over time on private insurance
enrollment and uninsurance. The results are summarized in Tables 2.10 and 2.11. I
consistently find that higher premiums are associated with positive and significant effect
on private insurance coverage for those just above the income cutoff. For the sample of
older children, a $1 increase in premium is found to lead to 2.5 to 1.4 percentage point
increase in the probability of being privately insured for children with family income,
respectively, within −15/ + 15 to −25/ + 25 percent of the FPL. The premium effect
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estimates obtained with data on all children point to an increase in the probability
of private enrollment in the range of 2.3 to 1.2 percentage points in response to an
average increase of $1 in the premium for the high income group. The estimates of
the treatment dummy vary with the bandwidth. After controlling for the premium,
treatment status still has a statistically significant impact on enrollment when data for
the two samples and three bandwidths are used. The period dummy point estimates
are small, negative, and sensitive to bandwidth selection. A joint test of the income
polynomial significance reveals that family income is not an important determinant of
the probability of being privately insured for children in the −15/+15, −20/+20, and
−25/ + 25 income range. Testing jointly all state dummies shows that state-specific
characteristics have a statistically significant impact on enrollment in private plans.
Testing the robustness of these findings shows that the full sample produces different
point estimates.
Table 2.11 presents the findings for the impact of SCHIP premium temporal vari-
ation on having no insurance. A different pattern of results emerges. The premium is
estimated to have at most a trivial impact on uninsurance, while higher-income group
status appears to have a negative and statistically important effect. These findings hold
true for all samples and bandwidths considered. The period dummy does not impact
on the insurance status of the child. A joint test of the income polynomial significance
reveals that income is not an important determinant of whether the child has any in-
surance coverage or not. Testing jointly the significance of state dummies provides the
same conclusions. A test for robustness shows that including the largest state X in the
difference-in-differences estimation leads to a new set of point of estimates.
Since I am looking at the changes in the insurance status of children over time,
there could be changes in the number of eligible children due to changes in child age
and/or family income. Therefore, the coefficient estimates for the premium effect on
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public insurance, private insurance, and uninsurance should not necessarily sum up to
0.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I obtain three sets of estimates for the premium increase effect on pri-
vate insurance enrollment and uninsurance status. My main regression-discontinuity
findings provide statistical support for the hypothesis that higher SCHIP premiums
are associated with an increase in the probability of being privately insured. Higher
SCHIP premiums do not seem to impact the uninsurance status of the child. The
regression-discontinuity procedure is shown to produce estimates that are robust to
distributional and functional form assumptions and omitted-variables problems. The
cross-sectional analysis supports the individual-state findings of statistically important
enrollment increases in private insurance. The pooled cross-sections present mixed ev-
idence of a statistically important decline in the probability of having no coverage in
response to higher premiums for the SCHIP insurance. The 2003 longitudinal estimates
of the impact of SCHIP premium on private insurance reinforces the individual state
and cross-sectional findings. The longitudinal uninsurance results point to at most a
trivial impact of premiums on uninsurance.
This paper presents a significant amount of evidence that SCHIP-eligible children
who opt out of public coverage because of higher premiums are very likely to acquire
insurance from a private source. I find no evidence that these children become uninsured
instead. Since children transition from public to private insurance coverage, state
policies to charge beneficiaries premiums on a sliding scale do not pose a significant
public health and policy problem. On the contrary, lowering the premiums is estimated
to lead to private insurance crowd-out.
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Table 2.1: Summary of SCHIP eligibility limits and premiums, by income group as of
Jan 2003, Dec 2003, and Dec 2004:
GROUP I GROUP II
Jan 2003 Dec 2003 Dec 2004 Jan 2003 Dec 2003 Dec 2004
St Type Elig Prem Elig Prem Elig Prem Elig Prem Elig Prem Elig Prem
al schip 150 0 175 4.17 175 4.17 200 4.17 200 8.33 200 8.33
tn mdc 100 0 100 0 100 0 . . . . . .
ar mdc 200 0 200 0 200 0 . . . . . .
az schip 150 0 150 0 150 10 175 10 175 10 175 20
ca comb 150 7 150 7 150 7 250 9 250 9 250 9
co schip 133 0 133 0 133 0 150 0 150 0 150 0
ct schip 235 0 235 0 235 0 300 30 300 30 300 30
de comb 133 10 133 10 133 10 166 15 166 15 166 15
dc mdc 200 0 200 0 200 0 . . . . . .
fl comb 150 15 150 15 150 15 200 15 200 20 200 20
ga schip 150 7.5 150 10 150 10 235 7.5 235 10 235 10
ia comb 150 0 150 0 150 0 200 10 200 10 200 0
id mdc 150 0 150 0 185 0 . . . . . .
il comb 150 0 150 0 150 0 200 15 200 15 200 15
in comb 175 11 175 11 175 11 200 16.5 200 16.5 200 16.5
ks schip 175 30 175 20 175 20 200 45 200 30 200 30
ky comb 200 0 200 20 200 20 . . . . . .
la comb 200 0 200 0 200 0 . . . . . .
ma comb 200 10 200 12 200 12 . . . . . .
md comb 200 0 200 37 175 0 250 40 250 40 250 41
me comb 160 5 160 5 160 8 170 10 170 10 170 16
mi comb 200 5 200 5 200 5 . . . . . .
mn comb 280 0 280 0 280 0 . . . . . .
mo mdc 185 0 185 0 185 0 225 0 225 0 225 0
ms mdc 150 0 150 0 150 0 175 0 175 0 175 0
mt schip 150 0 150 0 150 0 . . . . . .
nc schip 150 0 150 0 150 4.17 200 4.17 150 4.17 150 4.17
nd comb 140 0 140 0 140 0 . . . . . .
ne mdc 185 0 185 0 185 0 . . . . . .
nh comb 250 25 250 25 250 25 300 45 300 45 300 45
nj comb 200 15 200 16.5 200 16.5 250 30 250 33 250 33
nm mdc 235 0 235 0 235 0 . . . . . .
ny comb 222 9 222 9 222 9 250 15 250 15 250 15
nv schip 150 3.33 150 5 150 5 175 8.33 175 11.67 175 11.67
oh mdc 200 0 200 0 200 0 . . . . . .
ok mdc 185 0 185 0 185 0 . . . . . .
or mdc 185 0 185 0 185 0 . . . . . .
pa schip 200 0 200 0 200 0 . . . . . .
ri mdc 185 61 185 61 185 61 200 77 200 77 200 77
sc mdc 150 0 150 0 150 0 . . . . . .
sd mdc 200 0 200 0 200 0 . . . . . .
tx schip 150 1.25 150 1.25 150 1.25 185 1.25 185 1.67 185 1.67
ut schip 150 3.25 150 3.25 150 3.25 200 6.25 200 6.25 200 6.25
va comb 150 0 150 0 150 0 200 0 200 0 200 0
vt schip 300 50 300 70 300 70 . . . . . .
wa schip 250 10 250 10 250 15 . . . . . .
wv schip 150 0 150 0 150 0 200 0 200 0 200 .
wi mdc 200 ** 200 ** 200 ** . . . . . .
wy comb 185 0 185 0 185 0 . . . . . .
ak mdc 200 0 175 0 175 0 . . . . . .
hi mdc 200 0 200 0 200 0 . . . . . .
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics – Cross-Sectional Data
Public, and private enrollment, and “no insurance” rates, average family income, premium, and age at a point in time for: (i) all states with
two income groups, (ii) all states except state X, and (iii) state X only
All States All but State X State X
Income Group Variable Mean St. D. N Mean St. D. N Mean St. D. N
Group I Publ enroll 0.518 0.5 587 0.46 0.5 317 0.589 0.493 270
Priv enroll 0.269 0.444 587 0.38 0.49 317 0.133 0.341 270
No insurance 0.213 0.41 587 0.16 0.36 317 0.278 0.449 270
Income 126.203 14.881 587 128.16 14.51 317 123.912 15.016 270
Premium 5.016 5.524 587 3.33 6.68 317 7 0 270
Child age 10.973 4.36 587 10.90 4.45 317 11.063 4.257 270
Group II Publ coverage 0.303 0.4 1044 0.27 0.44 664 0.366 0.482 380
Priv coverage 0.576 0.494 1044 0.61 0.49 664 0.513 0.5 380
No insurance 0.122 0.327 1044 0.12 0.33 664 0.121 0.327 380
Income 189.895 26.52 1044 189.98 25.73 664 189.75 28.034 380
Premium 12.658 10.305 1044 15.75 13.24 664 9 0 380
Child age 9.822 5.102 1044 9.86 5.17 664 9.755 4.989 38081
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics – Longitudinal Data
Public, and private enrollment, and “no insurance” rates, average family income, premium, child age, and health as of January and December of
2003 for: (i) all states with two income groups, (ii) all states except state X
All States All but State X
B.Ch. A.Ch. B.Ch. A.Ch.
Group Variable Mean St.D. N Mean St.D. N Mean St.D. N Mean St.D. N
Group I Publ enroll 0.423 0.494 926 0.42 0.494 932 0.37 0.48 670 0.37 0.48 676
Priv enroll 0.367 0.482 926 0.368 0.483 932 0.45 0.50 670 0.45 0.50 676
No insurance 0.217 0.412 926 0.216 0.411 932 0.18 0.38 670 0.18 0.38 676
Income 142.75 43.27 926 143.03 43.35 932 150.28 47.87 670 150.59 47.87 676
Premium 4.99 7.17 926 5.88 7.16 932 4.22 8.30 670 5.10 8.43 676
Child age 10.16 4.63 926 10.15 4.65 932 10.02 4.87 670 10.01 4.90 676
Health state 3.49 1.64 926 3.48 1.65 932 3.49 1.60 670 3.48 1.62 676
Group II Publ coverage 0.33 0.47 604 0.32 0.47 598 0.26 0.44 284 0.26 0.44 278
Priv coverage 0.575 0.495 604 0.577 0.494 598 0.69 0.46 284 0.69 0.46 278
No insurance 0.101 0.302 604 0.100 0.301 598 0.06 0.23 284 0.05 0.22 278
Income 191.94 27.91 604 192.29 27.83 598 193.69 29.82 284 194.48 29.63 278
Premium 10.55 7.13 604 11.53 7.53 598 12.29 10.13 284 13.91 10.81 278
Child age 9.88 4.99 604 9.84 4.98 598 9.72 5.21 284 9.64 5.18 278
Health status 3.47 1.69 604 3.46 1.7 598 3.49 1.70 284 3.47 1.71 278
82
Table 2.4: Private Enrollment Estimated Average – State X
LOESS estimates of private enrollment in State X for separately all children and older children
All Ages Age 6 and older
Band Av. Enr. Effect N Av. Enr. Effect N
B/A B/A B/A B/A B/A
-15/15 0.073/0.404 0.331 89/107 0.061/0.387 0.326 61/84
-20/20 0.080/0.407 0.327 98/127 0.071/0.393 0.322 69/99
-25/25 0.092/0.415 0.323 122/147 0.087/0.404 0.317 93/115
Table 2.5: No Insurance Estimated Average – State X
LOESS estimates of uninsurance in State X separately for all children and older children
All Ages Age 6 and older
Band Av. Enr. Effect N Av. Enr. Effect N
B/A B/A B/A B/A B/A
-15/15 0.286/0.136 0.150 89/107 0.306/0.125 0.181 61/84
-20/20 0.289/0.138 0.151 98/127 0.306/0.128 0.178 69/99
-25/25 0.291/0.139 0.152 122/147 0.305/0.128 0.177 93/115
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Table 2.6: Private Insurance – Regression-Discontinuity Estimates
RD estimates for the three smallest samples based on data for the largest state. * - indicates
significance at the 5 percent confidence level of the two-tail null there is no difference in the impact
of premium on enrollment in two groups.
Bandwidth Treatment Elasticity N
Below/Above Effect Below/Above
Older Children
-15/15 0.323 6.68 61/84
(.229)
-20/20 0.272 4.626 69/99
(.184)
-25/25 0.366* 6.525 93/115
(.158)
All Children
-15/15 0.067 1.001 89/107
(.176)
-20/20 0.201 3.032 98/127
(.149)
-25/25 0.282* 4.47 122/147
(.133)
Table 2.7: No Insurance – Regression-Discontinuity Estimates
RD estimates for the three smallest samples based on data for the largest state
Bandwidth Treatment Elasticity N
Below/Above Effect Below/Above
Older Children
-15/15 0.139 3.112 61/84
(.214)
-20/20 0.107 2.169 69/99
(.173)
-25/25 -0.171 -2.903 93/115
(.157)
All Children
-15/15 0.238 5.37 89/107
(.169)
-20/20 0.091 1.703 98/127
(.143)
-25/25 -0.111 -1.895 122/147
(.130)
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Table 2.8: Private Insurance - Cross-Sectional Estimates
Cross-sectional estimates for the three smallest samples using pooled data on all states with two
income groups and all states excluding state X. * - indicates significance at the 5 percent confidence
level of the two-tail null that the impact of premium on enrollment on either side of the income
cutoff is the same
Bandwidth Premium Jump N Premium Jump N
Below/Above All States Below/Above No State X Below/Above
Older Children
-15/15 0.028* 172/125 0.046* 111/41
(.011) (.012)
-20/20 0.021* 203/145 0.029* 134/46
(.01) (.011)
-25/25 0.022* 247/180 0.030* 154/65
(.009) (.010)
All Children
-15/15 0.022* 212/167 0.034* 123/60
(.01) (.011)
-20/20 0.018* 256/191 0.022* 158/64
(.009) (.010)
-25/25 .017* 317/230 0.020* 195/83
(.008) (.009)
Table 2.9: No Insurance - Cross-Sectional Estimates
Premium change estimates for three different bandwidths based on data for all states with two
income groups and all states excluding State X. * - indicates significance at the 5 percent confidence
level of the two-tail null that the impact of premium on enrollment on either side of the income
cutoff is the same ** - indicates significance at the 5 percent confidence level of the one tail null
Bandwidth Premium Jump N Premium Jump N
Below/Above All States Below/Above No State X Below/Above
Older Children
-15/15 -0.011 172/125 -0.023* 111/41
(.01) (.009)
-20/20 -0.012 203/145 -0.013 134/46
(.01) (.009)
-25/25 -0.015* 247/180 -0.015* 154/65
(.008) (.008)
All Children
-15/15 -0.008 212/167 -0.016** 123/60
(.009) (.009)
-20/20 -0.009 256/191 -0.010 158/64
(.008) (.007)
-25/25 -0.010 317/230 -0.010 195/83
(.006) (.006)
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Table 2.10: Private Insurance - Difference-in-Differences Estimates
Difference-in-differences estimates for three bandwidths using data on all states and all states excluding State X. * - indicates significance at the
5 percent confidence level of the two-tail null that the impact of premium on enrollment on either side of the income cutoff is the same
All States All but State X
Bandwidth Prem. Treat. Period N Prem. Treat. Period N
Below/Above Jump Dummy Dummy Below/Above Jump Dummy Dummy Below/Above
Older Children
-15/15 0.021* 0.270* -0.014 128/142 0.025* 0.389* -0.030 68/82
(.007) (.099) (.049) (.009) (.123) (.066)
-20/20 0.014* 0.151 -0.008 152/174 0.014* 0.210 * 0.005 84/106
(.005) (.08) (.045) (.005) (.102) (.060)
-25/25 0.014* 0.205* -0.018 285/312 0.015* 0.258* -0.006 90/120
(.004) (.071) (.039) (.005) (.010) (.057)
All Children
-15/15 0.022* 0.240* -.009 166/164 0.023* 0.330* -0.019 82/90
(.005) (.08) (.042) (.006) (.107) (.062)
-20/20 0.016* 0.107 -0.012 152/174 0.015* 0.153 -0.005 98/126
(.004) (.07) (.039) (.004) (.096) (.057)
-25/25 0.011* 0.189* -0.017 351/387 0.012* 0.239* -0.010 106/148
(.003) (.062) (.035) (.004) (.089) (.054)
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Table 2.11: No Insurance - Difference-in-Differences Estimates
Difference-in-differences estimates for three bandwidths using data on all states and on all states excluding State X. * - indicates significance at
the 5 percent confidence level of the two-tail null that the impact of premium on enrollment on either side of the income cutoff is the same
All States All but State X
Bandwidth Prem. Treat. Period N Prem. Treat. Period N
Below/Above Jump Dummy Dummy Below/Above Jump Dummy Dummy Below/Above
Older Children
-15/15 -0.01 -0.416* 0.073 128/142 -0.012** -0.643* 0.082 68/82
(.007) (.092) (.046) (.007) (.103) (.056)
-20/20 0.001 -0.238* 0.042 152/174 0.002 -0.415* 0.050 84/106
(.004) (.071) (.04) (.004) (.082) (.048)
-25/25 -0.000 -0.270* 0.086* 285/312 0.002 -0.446* 0.055 90/120
(.004) (.069) (.038) (.004) (.080) (.046)
All Children
-15/15 -0.004 -0.331* 0.080 166/164 -0.005 -0.481* 0.074 82/90
(.005) (.082) (.042) (.004) (.090) (.051)
-20/20 0.000 -0.202* 0.055 192/210 0.001 -0.307* 0.062 98/126
(.004) (.066) (.037) (.003) (.073) (.043)
-25/25 -0.001 -0.232* 0.086* 351/387 0.000 -0.307* 0.063 106/148
(.003) (.061) (.034) (.003) (.067) (.040)
87
Figure 2.1: Estimated Private Coverage - All Children
Scatter diagram of the LOESS estimates of private insurance enrollment as a function of the family income index for children in state X. The
results are for smoothing parameter=.8, and local polynomial of first degree.
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Figure 2.2: Estimated Uninsurance Rate - All Children
Scatter diagram of the LOESS estimates of the rate of uninsurance as a function of the family income index for children in state X. The results
are for smoothing parameter=.8, and local polynomial of first degree.
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Figure 2.3: Estimated Private Coverage - Older Children
Scatter diagram of the LOESS estimates of private insurance enrollment as a function of the family income index for children who are 6 years of
age and older in state X. The results are for smoothing parameter=.8, and local polynomial of first degree.
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Figure 2.4: Estimated Uninsurance Rate - Older Children
Scatter diagram of the LOESS estimates of the rate of uninsurance as a function of the family income index for children who are 6 years of age
and older in state X. The results are for smoothing parameter=.8, and local polynomial of first degree.
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Table 2.12: Special Rules Imposed on Minor Parents Eligibility
Can be the head of unit Cannot be the head of unit
Alabama Delaware
Alaska Idaho
Arizona Kansas
Arkansas Louisiana
California Maryland
Colorado North Carolina
Connecticut West Virginia
Florida Wisconsin
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Washington D.C.
Wyoming
92
Appendix
Lemma 2.7.1 Let X is a matrix n× (m+1), X ′X is full-rank and one of the column-
vectors of matrix X is a vector of ones, then (X ′X)−1X ′1 = [1, 0, . . . , 0]′.
Proof:
Let the matrix X consists of a vector of 1, X˜n×m matrix of other explanatory
variables, X˜ is a column vector of sample means. Then the (m+ 1)× (m+ 1) matrix
X ′X can be partitioned in the following way:

 c b′
b A


where A = X˜ ′X˜ , b = nX˜ , c = n. The inverse of X ′X is
(X ′X)−1 =

 1k − 1kb′A−1
− 1
k
A−1b (A− 1
c
bb′)−1

 =

 1k − 1kb′A−1
− 1
k
A−1b A−1 + 1
k
A−1bb′A−1


where k = c− b′A−1b, and
X ′1 =

 nX˜
n

 =

 b
c


Then,
(X ′X)−1X ′1 =

 − b
′A−1b
c−b′A−1b
+ c
c−b′A−1b
A−1b+ A
−1bb′A−1b
c−b′A−1b
− A
−1bc
c−b′A−1b

 =

 1
0

 = γ̂
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